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 The dissertation aims to help us understand the economic mechanism of and the 
impacts of international trade and factor flows. It comprises three essays, each of which 
focuses on a separate aspect of trade and factor flows.  
 The first essay illuminates the issue of trade policy and illegal immigration in a 
rigorous theoretical analysis. We emphasize the presence of the interrelationship between 
trade policy and illegal immigration by employing the so called Meade model. First, we 
present an analysis of the relationship between trade policy and illegal immigration. 
Second, we analyze the welfare effects of complete movement to free trade in the 
presence of illegal immigration. Third, we illustrate the conditions under which bilateral 
trade negotiations are compatible with multilateral trade negotiations. Finally, we extend 
the analysis to a large open economy case.  Terms of trade effects add some complexity 
to the effects of trade liberalization on illegal immigration and economic welfare. 
 The second essay focuses on the effect of international trade and factor flows on 
domestic taxation. We examine how the effective tax rates of labor, capital and 
consumption (for OECD members) are related to economic integration. The empirical 
analysis extends the existing literature by incorporating factor flows into the equation. 
We find that labor flows have a negative association with the effective tax rates of capital 
and consumption.  The trade volume is found to have a relatively weak link with taxation.  
 The third essay scrutinizes the effect of trade policy on domestic wage rates by 
looking into different regions of the US economy. The main purpose is to conduct an 
empirical analysis of the effects of trade policy on regional wage differences.  We find 
some evidence that various tariffs and non-tariff barriers have had regional impacts on 
the skill premium in US wages.  The overall findings indicate that regional impacts of 
trade policy may differ.  This suggests a need for more careful assessment of welfare 
effects at the regional level.   
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 The world is seeing unprecedented levels of international trade and globalization.  
The trade volume of the world four decades ago was just above 1.6 trillion dollars (1995 
US$), or 25 percent of the world GDP. Twenty-three countries in OECD shared about 92 
percent of the world trade volume, or equivalently 23 percent of the world GDP. Since 
then, the figure has grown exponentially. By the end of twentieth century, the world 
traded goods and services worth 16 trillion dollars (1995 US$). This is a tenfold increase 
in four decades. Currently, the world economy relies on international trade for about 46 
percent of its GDP. OECD’s trade volume has gone up to 11 trillion dollars. This is 89 
percent of the world trade volume, and equivalent to 40 percent of the world GDP.  Non-

























































 The process of economic integration is not limited to an increased flow of 
merchandise. Production inputs are also crossing borders around the world. Gross 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for OECD countries was merely 1 percent of GDP in 
1970. Now, the figure is reaching about 10 percent of GDP.  In 1970, gross private 
capital flows (which include both direct and indirect investment) were below 10 percent 
of GDP in OECD with the solitary exception of the Netherlands.  In 2000, the average 
gross private capital flows amounted to around 59 percent.  Countries such as Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have values of capital crossing 
their borders to exceed their corresponding GDPs.  It is a puzzling fact for economists 
that so much capital heads to the regions where capital is already abundant (as the Center 
for Global Development pointed out)1. However, undoubtedly, in these countries, foreign 
capital is an indispensable source of economic growth. 
 
                                                 
1 Refer “Facts and Figures” at the Center for Global Development web site: http://www.cgdev.org/ 
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[figure 2] 















































 The flows of merchandise and capital have surged in the past decades and this fact 
stood out among many economic changes we have experienced. The only exception 
could be the technological improvements. Compared to the movements of merchandise 
and capital, labor faces a larger barrier to mobility. In almost every country, until the 
emergence of the European Union, the mobility of workers across borders was very 
limited. Nevertheless, the share of foreign labor in the total labor force has been on an  
upward trend except in Australia and in the United Kingdom where the share has been 
stable for the past decade. Yet, as the population grew, the actual number of foreign labor 
inflows has been rising even in these two countries. 
 While we mention the legal mobility of labor, one can imagine that there is a great 
incentive for illegal migration, as well.  Because of the illegal nature, there is no accurate 
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official figure on how many illegal laborers have crossed borders or how many have 
attempted.  However, the statistics of border apprehensions are available for some nations 
and provides some insights into the nature and extent of the problem.  In 1961, the 
number of aliens apprehended at the border of the United States was near 90,000. The 
number climbed to 1.6 million in 1996 according to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Statistics. It is clear that there is a growing pressure of labor inflows, either legal 
or illegal. 
[figure 3] 


















































 The increase in the flows of merchandise, capital, and labor is a part of the 
process of economic integration. The wave of economic integration reaches almost every 
society and the effects are felt by people administering customs restrictions at ports, 
shoppers at local retail stores, and job seekers at local labor markets. This dissertation 
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focuses on three distinct phenomena that are related to international trade and factor 
flows that are associated with such economic integration. 
 First, we look into the relation between trade policy and illegal immigration. We 
have already mentioned some facts regarding an increasing number of border 
apprehensions in the United States.  Naturally, the number of those who attempted to 
cross the border illegally should far exceed the number of apprehensions. According to 
the United States General Accounting Office, 1,013 migrants died trying to cross the 
Southwest border illegally between October 1997 and June 2001 of which 60 percent 
died from either heat exposure or drowning.  Other deaths are attributed to exposure to 
cold, motor vehicle accidents, train accidents, confined space, etc. Some 15 percent of 
deaths are from unknown causes. Because of the financial cost of enforcement and the 
humanitarian costs associated with illegal immigration, it is important to understand the 
relation between enforcement policy, trade policy and illegal immigration.  We use the 
Meade model that includes three countries and three goods, of which two share a border. 
When policy is unilaterally determined, two countries sharing a border set their optimal 
tariffs after recognizing how they impact border and internal enforcement.   At a first 
glance, it may seem that trade policy and enforcement policy are unrelated.  However, we 
argue that is not true.  Tariffs alter domestic prices and wages and influence the 
incentives of migrants.  We analyze how these incentives are altered due to trade 
liberalization thereby affecting illegal immigration. We analyze the condition under 
which a complete movement toward free trade improves the economic welfare of the 
countries involved.  We also discuss a situation where multilateral and bilateral trade 
liberalization are compatible in the presence of illegal immigration. Finally, the analysis 
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is extended to the large union case where the complex relations between tariffs, terms of 
trade, and illegal immigration are present.   
 Second, we move our focus to domestic taxation in relation to economic 
integration. We particularly examine OECD countries where there has been significant 
extent of economic integration.  These countries though their goods markets and factor 
markets are more open to the world than ever but differ in the extent to which they rely 
on international trade.  In the year 2000, the trade volume as a percentage of GDP 
exceeded 100 percent for the countries such as Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.  Japan and the United States had corresponding figure of 18 and 24 
percentage, respectively. The reliance on foreign labor in each country is also 
significantly different. For instance, Luxembourg’s share of foreign labor was above 57 
percent. Australia follows with 24 percent. Austria and Switzerland had 10 percent and 
18 percent, respectively. The figure for Japan was less than 1 percent. Finland and Spain 
barely exceeded 1 percent. Thus, the integration of labor markets significantly varies   
across OECD members. The same is true for FDI. The net inflow of FDI as a share of 
GDP exceeded 20 percent for Denmark and Ireland in 2000. Compared to these 
countries, Greece and Japan received FDI of about 0.9 and 0.1 percent, respectively.  
 
Although all OECD countries have become much more open, some experienced 
rapid integration with high growth of trade of merchandise and factor flows, while others 
have opted for a slower speed. Has this difference contributed to the difference in 
domestic taxation among OECD countries? The effective tax rates on earnings from 
capital income in Sweden and the United Kingdom exceed 50 percent while the 
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corresponding rate in Spain is 15 percent. When one compares the taxation on earnings 
from labor income, the Netherlands impose the highest - nearly 50 percent of the 
effective labor tax rate, while the lowest was in Australia with 16 percent. For the taxes 
on consumption, Denmark and Norway have the effective consumption tax rates of near 
35 percent, while Japan, Switzerland, and the United States are well below 10 percent. 
Can these differences in domestic taxation be explained by the differences in economic 
integration? We tackle this question empirically and find that the impact of economic 
integration on taxes on capital and labor is weak. We also observe that an increasing 
intensity of economic integration in the form of more trade and factor flows is associated 
with a lower effective consumption tax rate. Labor inflow is found to be particularly 
significant in this link.  The consumption tax and possibly capital tax are negatively 
associated with labor inflow. These findings inform us about how the current trend of 
globalization can impact each country and its policy making. Developing countries tend 
to struggle to raise government revenues necessary to provide public services and to 
implement redistributive policy. This study may be applied to point out another challenge 
for these nations as they deal with globalization. 
 Third, we scrutinize whether increasing integration of a nation with the global 
economy has asymmetric effects on different regions within it.  Traditional trade theory 
assumes regions are homogeneous within a country, and treats a country as a point 
without space.  The idea is that factors are fully mobile within a country. Therefore, when 
different wage rates are observed among regions, laborers move across regions 
immediately. This assures that wage rates are equalized among the regions. However, a 
recent study found that wage equality is often violated in several countries. Bernard, 
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Jensen, and Schott (2001) examine whether relative wage rates are equalized in the 
United States and found evidence against it. Bernard, Redding, Schott, and Simpson 
(2002) analyze the United Kingdom, and find evidence against wage equalization. 
Bernard, Robertson, and Schott (2004) study the case of Mexico, and again they find that 
wage rates are not equalized. These studies provide reasons to doubt the assumption that 
factors are fully mobile within a country. They furthermore postulate that factor 
abundance may be sufficiently different across regions and that there may be distinct 
groups of regions with different comparative advantages in production. If this is the case, 
changes in trade policy, as a part of economic integration, will have differential regional 
impacts within a country. As tariff rates and Non-Tariff Barriers are altered, the wage rate 
in one region can change totally in the opposite direction from another region. We pose 
this question in the case of the United States and examine it empirically.  We utilize the 
recent data on Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) in addition to the data on tariff rates in the 
United States. The information on NTBs is often ignored in the empirical trade literature. 
However, its importance as trade barriers has been increasing in the past and we believe it 
is crucial to include.  We find that tariffs and NTBs had distinct regional impacts on US 
wages.  Interestingly, NTBs exhibit much greater degree of asymmetric regional effects 
compared to tariffs.  Our findings underline the importance of assessing trade policies not 
only in terms of their impact on national welfare but also from the perspective of 
distribution of their effects between regions.   
To summarize, this thesis focuses on the following issues: (i).  trade policy in the 
presence of illegal immigration; (ii). impact of integration and openness on domestic 
taxation; and, (iii). the asymmetric regional impacts of trade policy.   
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Chapter 2 
Trade Policy and Illegal Immigration 
 
1. Introduction 
Regional trading agreements have become very popular in recent times.  Some 
well known trading blocs are NAFTA, EU, SAARC, and MERCOSUR.  However, there 
are several others which are less prominent.  While these agreements strive to eliminate 
trade barriers within blocs, they typically do not achieve complete free trade (see Baldwin 
and Venables, 1995).  Each member tries to pursue their own interests such as the amount 
of tariff reduction that they are willing to concede in return for better access to their 
partners’ markets.  Also, the issues on the negotiation table are not limited to trade policy 
alone, but cover a variety of related problems.  Illegal immigration is one of the important 
related issues, especially for PTAs that involve bordering nations.   
Illegal immigration has been a serious problem in NAFTA, especially along the 
US-Mexico border.  Recent estimates (see Orrenius 2001) suggest that there are about 3 
million undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US in 1997.  About 202,000 Mexicans 
immigrated per year between 1987 and 1996.  Tariffs change domestic prices, and cause 
adjustment between different sectors and indirectly affect the labor market.  The resulting 
change in labor market conditions influence immigration flows.  On the other hand, 
immigration flows due to changes in the source nation or due to policy, directly affect the 
labor market.  Clearly, these two issues, tariff and immigration, are interrelated.  Thus 
trade negotiations have to and do consider these issues simultaneously.2
                                                 
2 NAFTA negotiations/documents discuss both tariff liberalization and ways to control illegal labor flows.  
Former Attorney General Reno called the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico “..our best hope for reducing 
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The literature on regional trade agreements has explored a variety of issues (see 
for example, Ethier and Horn, 1984, Baldwin and Venables, 1995, Bhagwati, Krishna, 
and Panagariya, 1999).  Ethier and Horn (1984) have shown that (i) marginal reduction of 
tariff improves joint-welfare of trade bloc when starting from non-discriminatory tariff, 
and (ii) marginal increase in internal tariff improves joint-welfare of trade bloc when 
starting from free intra-trade bloc in a tariff-ridden world.  These imply the presence of 
the optimal positive internal tariff.  Panagariya (1999) derives the second best optimal 
tariff within the context of the Meade Model.  In addition to the analysis of marginal 
changes in tariffs, the literature has also explored the welfare implications of complete 
tariff elimination.  Panagariya and Krishna (2002) consider circumstances under which an 
FTA must improve the joint welfare of the bloc.   
While the existing literature has deepened our understanding of the nature of 
optimal trade taxes and of the welfare implications of regional integration, it has not 
adequately addressed the issue of illegal immigration. The agenda of this paper is to 
contribute towards improving our understanding of this issue by complementing the 
existing literature in four ways.  First, we consider how a mutual tariff reduction by bloc 
members alters the level of illegal immigration.  Second, we describe the nature of the 
non-cooperative equilibrium within the bloc.  Third, we analyze the welfare effect of 
complete intra-bloc tariff elimination (as in an FTA).  Finally, the analysis is extended to 
consider terms of trade effects of tariff changes (within the context of a trade bloc 
involving large nations) and how these impact the illegal immigration problem.   
                                                                                                                                                 
illegal immigration over the long haul.”  http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/101293-fact-sheet-on-
nafta-notes.htm 
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    The rest of the paper is organized in the following way.  Section 2 presents the 
basic model and analyzes the small-union case.  Section 3 extends the analysis to 
consider terms of trade effects.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.   The Small Union Case 
    We use the small-union Meade model used in Panagariya (1999) and 
Bandyopadhyay (2003).  There are three nations, A, B, and C.  Nations A and B form a 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA).  There are three goods; good-1, 2, and 3.  Nations 
A and B both produce goods 1 and 2.  Nation A exports good-1 and imports goods 2 and 
3.  Nation B exports good-2 and imports goods 1 and 3.  Nation C produces and exports 
good-3 while it imports goods 1 and 2.  We assume A and B impose import tariffs while 
C pursues free trade.  Trade liberalization within the bloc takes place as A reduces or 
eliminates import tariff on good-2 and B does the same for its import tariff on good-1. 
These tariffs may be denoted as internal tariffs (internal to the bloc) while the tariffs by A 
and B on good-3 are their respective external tariffs.  We abstract from strategic 
interactions in trade policy between the Bloc and the rest of the world, and focus on intra-
bloc strategic tariffs, tariff liberalization and how it affects the illegal immigration 
problem.3   Nation A is the host country for illegal immigration, while B is the source 
                                                 
3 Bandyopadhyay (2003) does address tariffs and illegal immigration.  However, unlike this paper he 
ignores the interdependence in trade policy between the bloc members.  The role of the latter and how it 
affects illegal immigration and national welfare is the central focus of this paper.  It should be noted that 
interdependence in trade policy is discussed (between a trading bloc and the rest of the world) in Bond, 
Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) and Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004).  Bond, Syropoulos, and 
Winters (2001) among others shed light on the mutual negotiation process.  They examine how formation 
of customs union with a certain country affects its trade agreements with other countries (multilateral 
agreements).  Their paper derives external tariff response functions of the customs union and the rest of 
world, and thus provides the conditions under which both a customs union and multilateral trade 
agreements are sustainable.  Our paper differs from the Bond et al. papers in two respects.  First, we focus 
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country.  Illegal immigrants send earnings back to B, thus, A does not retain immigrant’s 
factor rewards (for example, Orrenius (2001) states that:  “The out-migration of Mexican 
citizens brings in $4 billion to $7 billion in remittances each year.”).  Since prices 
(without tariffs) are given exogenously to the small countries within the bloc, we 
normalize them to be unity. TP4 PT  Illegal immigrants earn the wage IW  and the level of illegal 
immigration itself is I.  Their total earning is IWI , which is repatriated to B.  Thus, this 
amount must be subtracted from A’s revenue and added to B’s revenue.  The legal wage 
rate of nations A and B are denoted as AW  and BW , respectively.  The legal wage AW  is 
assumed to exceed BW  (this may be due to technology differences, tariffs, or other 
reasons).  This creates incentives for immigrants to illegally cross the border.  Nation A 
uses internal enforcement and border enforcement to control illegal immigration.  The 
enforcement costs are ie (internal) and be (border), respectively.  The tariff on good i by 
nation j is jit  where i = good 1,2, and 3, and j = nations A and B.  The standard 
expenditure-revenue equations for the three nations are described below.  The partial 
derivatives of expenditure and revenue functions are denoted by subscripts.  For instance, 
AE2  is the partial derivative of A’s expenditure function with respect to price of good-2. 
biI
AAAAAAAAAAAA eeIWEtREtIVtRuttE −−−+−+++=++ 33222232 )(),1,1(),1,1,1()1(  
IWEtREtIVtRuttE I
BBBBBBBBBBBB ++−+−+=++ 33111131 )(),1,1(),1,1,1()2(  
),1(),1,1,1()3( CCCC VRuE =  
                                                                                                                                                 
on interdependence in tariffs (pre-union) between bloc members.  Secondly, illegal immigration is a major 
issue in this paper. 
TP
4
PT Later, we relax this assumption. 
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We assume that revenue function is strictly concave in endowment, V , such that 
0<iVVR  for BAi ,= .  Following Ethier (1986) and Bond and Chen (1987), the following 
assumptions are made.  Firms can hire either legal workers and pay AW  or illegal 
workers and pay IW .  However, if firms are detected to be hiring illegal immigrants, they 
are fined z per unit of illegal labor.  There is a probability of detection, which depends on 
the level of internal enforcement.  This is denoted as: )( iepp = , 0'',0' <> pp .  The 
expected fine per illegal labor unit hired is zp , and on average this is what firms incur 
above the illegal wage when they hire an illegal immigrant.  Competitive firms equate the 
cost of hiring legal labor to the expected cost of hiring illegal labor. 
)()4( iI
A ezpWW +=  
Potential migrants in B face the risk of being caught by border enforcement.  The 
expected cost may be denoted as )( beββ = , 0'>β .  The illegal wage rate, net of this cost 
is: )( bI eW β− .   Assuming risk neutrality, the equilibrium migration condition dictates 
that the certainty wage in B is equated to the net expected wage from migration:   
)()5( bI
B eWW β−=  
 
2.1.   The effect of trade liberalization on the level of illegal immigration 
 This section first shows how tariff policy can affect the level of illegal 
immigration.  Then, we consider a special case where both nations agree to reduce the 
internal tariffs by the same amount under a Preferential Trade Agreement.  With 
(.)iV
i RW =  for i = A and B, equations (4) and (5) imply: 




V eeIVtRIVtR ρ  
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where, )()(),( ibbi ezpeee +≡ βρ . 
Relation-(6) implicitly defines the level of illegal immigration as: 
),,()7( 21 ρ
AB ttII =  
Let BVV
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Tariffs change the domestic import prices, hence, the wage rates. These in turn affect the 
incentive for illegal immigration.  The precise effect of the tariff on the immigration flow 
depends on the characteristics of the labor market in the host and source country.  That is, 
how responsive wages are to price changes as well as to changes in the total labor supply. 
Note that the parameter ρ  captures enforcement policy, and we suppress it (for now) to 


















In the following Lemma we discuss a special case where both countries reduce the 
internal tariffs by the same amount. 
Lemma 1.   Suppose under the Preferential Trade Agreement, A and B reduce the 
internal tariff by the same amount while A maintains the initial enforcement policy. 
Assume that wages in the two nations are positively related to the respective import 
prices.  Illegal immigration increases unambiguously if and only if the wage rate in the 
source country (B) responds more than the wage rate in the host country (A) to the 
change in the tariffs. 
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Proof: 
0)10( 21 <== dtdtdt
AB  
























∂ .  ■ 
1VR  is the response of the wage rate in a country when the domestic price of good 1 
changes due to a change in the tariff on the import of good 1.  Goods 1 and 2 are the 
import goods of B and A, respectively.  If the change in the protected (import) sector’s 
price affects the wage rate more in B than in A, the equal reduction of tariffs by both 
countries will increase the level of illegal immigration.TP5 PT  This lemma illustrates the 
importance of incorporating the effects of trade liberalization on illegal immigration in 
determining overall (trade and enforcement) policy.  In the following section, we 
examine optimal tariff reaction functions in the presence of illegal immigration. 
   
2.2. The Pre-Agreement Nash Tariff Equilibrium 
This sub-section derives the tariff reaction functions for A and B and describes the 
Nash tariff equilibrium.  Combining (1) and (4) yields: 
                                                 
TP
5
PT If the labor supply is more inelastic in the source country than in the host country, the change in price due 
to a tariff leads to a greater change in the wage rate in the source country.  This may be a reasonable 
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uu EEEEtEtED , 
due to the normality of all goods.  The second term in (14) may be interpreted as follows.  
Nation-A’s tariff on good 2 affects I which in turn has three effects captured by the 
numerator of the right hand side of (15).  They are the effects of a unit rise in I, and are, 
respectively, (a) the rise in government fine collections; (b) the expansion (or 
contraction) of domestic production of good 2 through the Rybczynski effect and the 
resulting effect on import duty collection; and, (c) the reduction in the legal wage in A 
leading to a lower wage payment to illegal labor.  Relations (14) and (15) endogenize the 
effects of variability of I and implicitly define the following Nash optimal tax reaction 
function for A: 
),,,()16( 3122 bi
ABAA eetttt =  

































u , we obtain the reaction function for A. 
















Relation-(19) implicitly defines the Nash tariff reaction function for A.  The slope of A’s 
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Relations (17), (18), (19) and (21) can be simultaneously solved to obtain the Nash 
equilibrium tariff rates for A and B, as well as the optimal enforcement levels ie  and be  
for nation-A.  The Nash tariff equilibrium is demonstrated in figure-1.     
Lemma 2.   If the wage rates in both sectors are positively related to their corresponding 
output prices, then the reaction functions for both countries are upward sloping. 
Proof:   Shown above in (20) and (22). 
In graph 1, a decrease in one nation’s tariff is associated with a reduction in the optimal 
tariff of the other nation.  The intersection of the tariff reaction functions gives the second 
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best Nash optimal tariff equilibrium.  Due to the presence of the external tariffs and 
illegal immigration, they are positive as shown in the graph 1.  ■ 
[graph 1] 
 
2.3.   The effect of a Free Trade Agreement on national welfare 
In this section, we analyze how the national welfare levels of A and B are affected 
if both nations agree to eliminate their tariffs on each other completely (i.e., completely 
eliminate import tariffs on goods 1 and 2).TP6 PT  The literature on second best tariffs (in the 
absence of illegal immigration considerations) suggests that complete liberalization may 
or may not raise welfare in an already distorted economy.TP7 PT   We explore how illegal 
immigration affects this conclusion and identify conditions under which complete 
liberalization will be welfare improving.  The following proposition formally states our 
findings. 
Proposition 1.   Suppose that the source country’s wage rate responds to tariff changes 
more than the wage rate in the host country, and that goods 2 and 3 (imports for the host 
country) are complements in consumption.  Then, a complete movement to free trade 
within a bloc consisting of A and B must be welfare improving (if before the FTA they 
had the same tariff level on their respective intra-bloc imports) while the illegal 
immigration increases for a given initial enforcement policy. 
                                                 
TP
6
PT Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004) consider the welfare effect of FTA when the rest of the world also 
reacts strategically.  While illegal immigration is not considered in their study, they find the complete 
liberalization within the context of an FTA is not optimal.  Our analysis assumes that the trading bloc holds 
the external tariff rates constant (i.e., the rest of the world practices free trade). 
TP
7
PT The Kemp-Wan proposition discussed in Ethier and Horn (1984) suggests that the adjustment of the 
external tariff makes the complete elimination of internal tariff under customs unions welfare improving 
without harming the rest of the world.  Panagariya and Krishna (2002) extends this to the case of an FTA.  
Throughout the analysis we hold the external tariff constant leaving the examination of the Kemp-Wan type 
of trade liberalization with the presence of illegal immigration to future research. 
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Proof: 
Let 012 <== dtdtdt





















V RR 21 > . Then, as we saw in the previous section, 0<dt
dI , i.e. FTA increases 
the illegal immigration. 
If we evaluate (15) at the Free Trade Agreement, ( 0,0 21 ==

























































Under the conditions of Lemma 2, 02 >
A
VIR .  If 032 <
AE (i.e., goods 2 and 3 are 
complements in consumption), the right hand side of (25) must be negative.  This ensures 
that the FTA is welfare improving because it implies that the right hand side of (23) is 
negative.  ■ 
If goods 2 and 3 are complements, as the tariff on good 2 is reduced, consumers 
demand more of it as well as of good 3.  This raises the tariff revenue collection from 
good 3.  Secondly, the reduction of tariff on good 2 reduces A’s wage rate.  This results 
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in lower payments to illegal immigrants and translates to a gain for A.  This is the second 
term in the numerator in (25).  Under complementarity, both these effects raise A’s real 
income and its welfare rises due to the liberalization.  If goods 2 and 3 are substitutes, the 
welfare implication of the FTA is in general ambiguous and depends on the balance of 
the tariff revenue effect and the wage earnings effect. 
The second term in (23) is negative.  From Lemma 1 we see that mutual trade 
liberalization raises illegal immigration. This lowers the immigrant wage income, while 
raising the expected fine collections from firms hiring them.  Thus, in the presence of 
endogenous illegal immigration, an FTA is more likely to be welfare enhancing. TP8 PT 
 
2.4.   Is multilateral trade liberalization compatible with bilateral trade 
liberalization? 
 In this section, we examine whether A would like to reduce the external tariff 
(i.e., the tariff on good 3) as a credible pre-commitment to multilateral trade 
liberalization.  First, we see how the reaction function of A is affected by the reduction of 
the tariff on good 3.  Second, we examine whether reducing the tariff on good 3 is 
welfare improving for A.TP9 PT  From (20) and (22), the slopes of the reaction functions do not 
change in response to the change in the tariff on good on 3. Denoting the left hand side of 
(19) as AΦ , 
                                                 
TP
8
PT It contradicts general public view that an increase in illegal immigration worsens the national welfare of 
the host country.  Here, readers should keep in mind that we focus on the economic analysis of illegal 




PT Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) discuss how trade liberalization in a customs union affects the 
multilateral trading process.  They find that intra-bloc trade liberalization which requires the reduction of 






























∂  is sufficiently large as is shown in the Appendix. Thus, if good 2 and 3 are 
substitutes (i.e., 032 >
AE ), the reduction in At3  will shift A’s reaction function down as 
described in the graph 2. On the other hand, if 032 <
AE , A’s reaction function shifts up. 
[graph 2] 
Let us consider the case where the goods are substitutes.  Given B’s reaction function, A 
knows that if it can pre-commit to a lower At3 , it would lead to a reduction in 
Bt1 .  The 








































u , the reduction of At3  is welfare enhancing for A.  In other word, multilateral 












Intuitively, if the initial internal tariff is high enough to start with, both multilateral trade 
liberalization and bilateral trade liberalization such as PTA are compatible with each 
other and lead to a movement in the direction of global free trade. 
Proposition 2.   Reduction of tariff on good-3 leads to lower (higher) Nash equilibrium 
tariffs for A and B’s intra-bloc trade if good 2 and 3 are substitutes (complements).  If the 
initial internal tariff is sufficiently high, reducing the external tariff is also welfare 
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improving for nation-A given good 2 and 3 are substitutes.  In this case, the multilateral 
trade liberalization process is compatible with bilateral trade liberalization. Furthermore, 
if the size of wage response in the host country is at least as large as that in the source 
country, illegal immigration decreases due to reduction of tariff on good-3. 
Proof:  The text preceding the proposition constitutes the proof.  ■    
  
3.   Large Open Economy 
This section extends the previous analysis to the case of a union of two large 
nations.  The analysis is more complicated because tariffs for A and B affect the world 
prices, which in turn affect the level of illegal immigration.  We start by defining the 
expenditure-revenue equation for A, B and C and then proceed to analyze how tariffs 
affect the border prices.  We discuss how the second best Nash optimal tariff equilibrium 
may differ in the context of a large open economy.  Using the price of good-3 as the 
numeraire, the expenditure-revenue functions for the three nations are: 
biI
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Walras’ law assures that the market for good 3 is in equilibrium.  The illegal immigration 
level is affected not only by tariffs but also through terms of trade effects.  The labor 
market equilibrium condition with endogenous prices is 




V eeIVtppRIVptpR ρ  
Thus, illegal immigration is defined as:  
),,,,()34( 1221 ρ
BA ttppII =  
The change in illegal immigration is:  
ρρdIdtIdtIdpIdpIdI
BA ++++= 14232211)35(  















Relation-(36) implicitly defines A’s utility as: 
),),,,,,(,,,,()37( 12213221 bi
BAAAAA eettppIttppuu ρ=  
The difference from the previous small economy cases [see relation-(13) earlier] is that 














Thus, B’s utility can be written implicitly as: 
)),,,,,(,,,,,()39( 122123121 b
BAABBBB ettppItttppuu ρ=  
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Next, we find how prices are related to the internal tariffs.  This is crucial in highlighting 
the strategic tariff policy of a PTA because members of a trading bloc negotiate over 
tariffs with a major issue being their intra-bloc and external terms of trade effects.   
Proposition 3.  When the own price effects dominate the cross price effects of tariff 
changes and the wage rate is more responsive to the change in the price of the import 
good (compared to the price of the export good),  mutual reductions of the intra-bloc 
tariffs improve both A and B’s terms of trade with respect to C. The illegal immigration 
may increase or decrease depending on how wages respond in each country. 
Proof:     The proof is provided in the Appendix at the end.  ■   









































































































The third term on the right hand side of (40) is the Nash condition in the case of a small 
economy, while the first two terms are the additional terms due to endogenous prices.  
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The latter terms capture how A uses strategic tariff policies to manipulate terms of trade 

















AA RE , as A is an importer of good 2.   
Thus, 02 <
Au  if 02 >
A
VR  and 





∂  is in 
general indeterminate though we have shown that the mutual tariff reductions by A and B 














pu . This tends to 
raise the second best tariff of A.  If AV
B
V RR 22 < , the effect is further accentuated.  On the 
other hand, if AV
B







































pu  pull in opposite directions.  
The import tariff on good 2 tends to keep the international price of good 2 low.  
However, this has adverse effect on the domestic wage rate.  Thus, the optimal strategic 
tariff has to balance the terms of trade benefit and its impact on the wage rate.  In the 
large economy case, the slope of the optimal tariff reaction function can either positive or 





    The paper focuses on the intra-bloc trade negotiation process in the presence of 
illegal immigration.  Our findings comprise largely of three parts.  First, we show that 
when the interaction between tariff policy and illegal immigration is ignored, trade 
liberalization may lead to an increase in illegal immigration.  This establishes the 
importance of incorporating both issues simultaneously in the negotiations.  Second, we 
identify conditions under which an FTA (i.e., complete elimination of tariffs within the 
bloc) is likely to be welfare improving in the presence of illegal immigration.  Finally, we 
consider terms of trade effects of tariff negotiations and how they will in turn affect the 























































AΦ  : A’s Reaction function 
BΦ  : B’s Reaction function 
E : Nash Equilibrium 
E’ 







'AΦ  : A’s Reaction function after reduction in At3  




1. Deriving A’s Optimal Tariff Reaction Function (Small Union Case):  
 






























































































2. Substitutability of good 2 and 3 in Proposition 2: 
From equation-(6), one notes that illegal immigration is independent of the external 
tariffs.  From the optimal enforcement policy conditions, (17) and (18), we find that the 
optimal enforcement policy instruments depend on the internal tariffs of A and B.  
However, they are independent of the external tariffs. We use this observation to derive 















































































































The first two terms in the denominator represent the second order condition for optimal 
At2  and therefore their sign is unambiguously negative.  If these two terms dominate the 







∂  is the 







∂  is positive and 
a reduction of At3  leads to a downward shift of A’s reaction function. Graph 2 depicts this 
case showing that both At2  and 
Bt1  decline, although the former decreases more than the 
later.  Given equations (8) and (9), if the size of the wage response in the host country is 









∂ , illegal immigration 
decreases due to reduction of tariff on good-3. 
 
3. Proof of Proposition 3: 
 




























































































































































where, CBACBA RRREEE 1111111111111 −−−++≡α , 
CBACBA RRREEE 2222222222222 −−−++≡α , and 
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V RRRR 2211 −=−  
The first two conditions imply that the rise in the price of the export good raises the wage 
rate by more than the rise in the price of the import good does.  The third and fourth 
conditions can be interpreted as the relationship between the own price effect and the 











































































































































































































































































































































A negotiates with B to obtain a reduction in Bt1 .  When both nations mutually reduce their 
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internal tariffs by the same amounts, its impact on the terms of trade for A (in terms of 























































































































V RR .  




































V RR . 






























=  where 012 <==
BA dtdtdt  
From above discussion, if 0,0,0 4321 <+>> IIII , then, the mutual tariff reduction 
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Chapter 3 
The impact of Trade and Factor Flows on Domestic Taxation 
 
1    Introduction 
 Over the past period, industrial countries have become more integrated with each 
other and into the world economy. They engage in international trade more freely and 
more capital flows between them, although the degree at which each economy is 
connected with the outside economy differs among the industrial countries. At the same 
time, each economy tries to maintain autonomous fiscal policy in the midst of 
globalization. Financing publicly provided goods and services and redistribution policy 
through taxation is crucial for each autonomous jurisdiction. While the distinction in the 
tax system among the countries is large, so is the distinction of the tax rates. Mendoza, 
Razin, Tesar (1994) studied the average effective tax rates on labor, capital, and 
consumption for OECD countries between 1965 and 1988. The average effective tax 
rates represent the tax burden in a representative agent model as well as the magnitude of 
tax distortion in each market. According to their calculation, the level of the tax rates and 
the time trends are seen as quite different among the sample countries. 
 For example, the level of consumption tax in the United States and Japan is 
maintained low throughout the sample period. On the other hand, European countries and 
Canada show high levels. The trends of consumption tax also differ among countries. 
France, the United States, and Japan exhibit a stable trend; while the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Italy exhibit decreasing rates up until the end of 1970’s and rising afterward. 
For the labor tax, all the examined countries show a rising trend, but with different 
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speeds. For instance, the U.S. labor tax rate rose until 1982, but, was stable afterward. 
France, Italy, and Japan exhibit a steady increase throughout the period. Canada shows a 
rise and fall as does the United Kingdom. The difference among the countries is also seen 
in the capital tax as well though as Mendoza etc. (1994) noted, it is more prone to the 
business cycles that the countries experience. 
 This paper aims to explore such differences in domestic taxation among the 
industrial countries. More specifically, we examine how the trade of goods and services 
and the flows of labor and capital affect the average effective tax rates on labor, capital 
and consumption. This paper aims to provide insights of why different countries, whose 
trade volume and factor flows vary, exhibited different dynamics of domestic taxation. 
 The various literatures have introduced the possible link between economic 
integration and domestic taxation. They claimed that the trade in goods and services may 
alter the elasticity of capital and labor, and hence, change the optimal tax rates for capital 
and labor. Economic integration encourages the flows of capital and labor between 
countries. This may directly alter the taxation on capital and labor as the tax bases are 
influenced. While the various channels at which domestic taxation might be affected have 
been discussed, the empirical scrutiny in this paper finds these channels rather weak, 
particularly the capital and labor tax rate. The features in economic integration such as 
international trade and factor flows across countries are found having no influence on the 
capital and labor tax rates. Instead, the paper finds strong evidence that economic 
integration with more net inflow of labor and capital and international trade is associated 
with lower consumption tax rates. While government may be simply shifting the tax 
burden away from consumers, this channel has not been explored in the literature, 
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especially the link between the consumption tax rate and factor flows. The essay urges 
further investigation on why factor flows influence the consumption tax. 
 Section 2 introduces some previous literatures in both theoretical and empirical 
studies to illustrate the link between economic integration and domestic taxation. Section 
3 provides the description of Data and the variables used in this study. Section 4 
discusses some empirical specification issues. Section 5 explains the results, and Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2   The literature review 
 In this section, we introduce some of the theoretical and empirical literature which 
explains the link between the features of economic integration and domestic taxation. In 
the later analysis, we use the effective tax rates as measurements of domestic taxes, 
which have developed rich arguments in the recent literature of measuring taxes. 
Therefore, we start with the summary of the recent development of the effective tax rate 
literature. 
 
2.1   The effective tax rates 
 Previously, researchers have developed the measurements of effective tax rates in 
various ways to answer critical economic questions such as what is the overall burden of 
taxes and what is the magnitude of tax distortions. The initial study on the effective tax 
rates focused on the capital income. King and Fullerton (1984) brought a main 
development in the literature of effective tax rates on earnings stemming from capital, 
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which was based on the earlier research on the investment theory by Jorgenson (1963) 
and the following researches by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and King (1974). The King-
Fullerton approach was criticized due to the complexity of calculation and the number of 
assumptions required. Responding to this criticism, Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) 
developed a much simpler method that uses the actual tax revue data at a Macro level. 
Yet this received as much controversy as the King-Fullerton approach due to the 
assumptions they made and its too much simplicity that departs from the reality. These 
two approaches are distinct in the fundamental concepts so called the forward-looking vs. 
backward-looking approach. The forward-looking approach hypothesizes a certain 
investment project and a household to calculate the capital, labor, and consumption tax 
rates that are expected. For this, it hypothesizes the types of assets, the ways of finance, 
the tax status of the investor and household. The tax rates calculated by King and 
Fullerton (1984) represent this forward-looking approach. The alternative approach, the 
backward-looking approach, uses the actual tax revenue collected and compares it with 
the before-tax incomes and/or expenditures. The method from Mendoza et al. (1994) 
corresponds to this backward-looking approach, and was used in Rodrik (1997) which 
analyzed why the distribution of tax shifted from capital to labor. Daveri and Tabellini 
(2000) also used Mendoza’s tax rates and argued that high labor tax rates in European 
continents led to systematically high unemployment rates. One of the criticisms that 
Mendoza’s tax rates face is that, due to the backward-looking nature, it does not provide 
a picture of how the concurrent tax system affects the incentives of economic agents’ 
behaviors on investment, labor supply, and consumption ex ante. However, as Sorensen 
(2004) summarizes, the forward-looking rate and the backward-looking rate become 
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identical when an economy grows at the golden rule, and the capital stock grows at a real 
interest rate being constant over time, and if the rate of depreciation in the tax code is 
constant over time at the true depreciation rate. Carey and Rabesona (2002) claim several 
assumptions in Mendoza et al. (1994) to be unrealistic. First, OECD’s Revenue Statistics 
does not define the source of household income as labor income and capital income. 
Thus, households are assumed to contribute the same tax rate to the capital tax and the 
labor tax. Second, the self-employed workers’ earning is assumed to be all capital 
income. Third, the deductibility of social security contributions from taxable income is 
not incorporated. Finally, taxable income includes social security contribution but not 
private employer’s contributions to pension funds in Mendoza’s tax rates. 
 Despite a number of restrictive assumptions, Mendoza et al. (1994) remains as the 
data that provides extensive countries and periods which are needed for the cross-country 
time series analysis such as ours. In addition, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) extended the 
available data to 1995.10
 
2.2   The theoretical development 
 There are two major channels that link economic integration and domestic 
taxation. First, trade in goods and services indirectly affects the demand elasticity of 
factors of production such as capital and labor. This change in elasticity alters the optimal 
tax rate on factor inputs based on the excess burden of taxation. Second, in an open 
economy, capital and labor can move across national borders. This factor mobility can 
                                                 
10 Enrique Mendoza generously makes the data available on his website. I also thank Francesco Daveri for 
providing the updated data. 
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have direct and indirect effect on both tax revenue and tax rates. The inflows of 
production factors alter the taxable bases that government can impose taxes, and in turn, 
raise tax revenues ceteris paribus the tax rates. They also directly alter the tax rates as 
some argue in the framework of a political economy model. Below, we provide the 
summary of each channel. 
 Slaughter (2001) provides the summary on how economic integration can make 
labor demand more elastic. Labor demand elasticity ( Lη ) is the weighted sum of the 
constant-output elasticity of substitution between labor and other factors (σ ) and the 
product demand elasticity (η ) as Hamermesh (1993) summarizes. 
ηση ssL −−−= ]1[)1(  where s is the share of labor in income. 
σ  is the indication of how much labor is substituted with other factor inputs holding 
output constant when the cost of labor becomes more expensive relative to other inputs. 
Opening trade increases σ  as firms have more access to foreign factor inputs including 
labor by shifting production abroad or buying intermediate inputs from abroad. Opening 
trade also increases the product demand elasticity, η , as firms face more foreign 
competition. Both of these contribute to an increase in the labor demand elasticity 
(Slaughter 2001). The empirical work in Slaughter (2001) provides the evidence that an 
increase in international trade has made the demand of production labor in manufacture 
industries more elastic. 
 In the partial equilibrium model, when either labor demand or labor supply or 
both become more elastic, the excess burden of labor tax increases. Thus, we may have 
lower taxes on labor income if in fact the labor market has become more elastic. If 
opening trade increases the labor demand elasticity, as claimed by Slaughter (2001), then, 
the labor tax rate has to be lowered so as to minimize the excess burden. Furthermore, the 
tax incidence literature shows that the incidence of the labor tax on the laborer increases 
if demand for labor becomes more elastic. Thus, the burden of the labor tax as well as 
other non-labor cost fall more on laborers and less on employers for any given tax rate. 
Rodrik (1997) pointed out two other impacts of an increase in labor demand elasticity on 
the labor market. As labor demand becomes more elastic, it takes bargaining power away 
from laborers. Thus, it becomes easier for employers to pass non-labor costs on to 
laborers. Also, it makes the labor market more volatile as external shocks that affect labor 
demand result in a larger change in the wage rate. With consideration to these effects, 
government may opt to lower labor tax rate. 
 By combining the trade impact on labor demand elasticity and the excess burden 
explanation along with its secondary effect noted above, economic integration may lead 
to a lower labor tax rate in a partial equilibrium framework. 
 The similar analogy to the above can be applied to taxation on capital. Economic 
integration may make the capital demand more elastic (Rodrik, 1997). If that is the case, 
further economic integration leads to the lower optimal capital tax rate. 
 Likewise, the optimal consumption tax rate is lowered as the demand elasticity in 
the goods market increases. The trade theory usually assumes that once an economy is 
opened to the world market, the domestic demand becomes infinitely elastic for firms. 
This leads to the optimal commodity tax to be zero. This is an extreme circumstance, in 
reality, since there are a numerous barriers to trade not only through tariffs but also Non-
Tariff Barriers and other barriers related to business customs, language, culture, etc. 
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However, still the principle remains that increasing economic integration lowers the 
optimal consumption tax rate. On the other hand, some literature including Keen and 
Ligthart (2002), Hatzipanayotou, Michael, and Miller (1994), and Michael, 
Hatzipanayotou, and Miller (1993) argue that elimination of tariffs combining with 
increase in consumption tax as to maintain revenue is welfare enhancing for a small open 
economy. It is left to empirical studies whether economic integration has done any to 
consumption taxes. 
 The second channel which economic integration influences domestic taxation is 
through the changes in the tax base. Economic integration comes with increase in flows 
of both goods and factor inputs, capital and labor. Net inflows of capital and labor 
increase the taxable base for governments. Due to the nature of public good in the 
publicly provided goods and services, labor inflow may not increase the cost of 
government spending per head linearly, and indeed may very well decrease.11 Net inflow 
of capital expands the taxable base and this allows governments to lower tax rates. 
Alternatively, factor inflow, particularly labor inflow may alter the political structure as 
Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) argue, and this may influence domestic taxation. 
Increase in immigration may lower the share of government spending that is appropriated 
for the native. Hence, the native voters may vote in favor of lower government spending 
per head and lower tax rates. Whether inflows of capital and labor have lowered the 
corresponding tax rates is an empirical question we tackle in this essay. 
 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, one can assume that government’s production function follows an increasing return to 
scale. Thus, the average cost to provide government services declines. 
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2.3   Review of some relevant empirical works 
 Rodrik (1997) estimates how openness to trade and exposure to external risk 
affect capital and labor tax rates. External risk is defined as the income variation due to 
exchange volatility. He found that openness is associated with a rise in the labor tax rate 
and a fall in the capital tax rate at statistically significant levels, though when external 
risk is taken into account, the erosion of the capital tax rate becomes insignificant. He 
claims that economic integration changes the structure of domestic taxation in the way 
that the tax burden shifts from capital to labor. 
 Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) study the effect of migration on the labor tax 
rate, and found that the larger share of immigrants in a population leads to a lower labor 
income tax with statistically a significant level. They explained that as the share of 
immigrants grows, a larger proportion of tax revenue is spent for immigrants. Thus, a 
median voter, not affected by immigration, tends to vote in favor of lower labor income 
tax. While trade itself is not a major concern for their paper, it is included in their 
estimation, and in the most of their specification, it has a negative coefficient though 
insignificant. This is different from Rodrik (1997). 
 While the literatures focus either on the capital tax or the labor tax, there is a 
possibility that the government shifts taxation on to consumption in response to an 
increase in economic integration with the world economy. Mendoza etc. (1994) noted 
that the countries with low capital tax rates tend to have high consumption tax rates. The 
economic integration may lower the capital tax rate, however, the burden of taxation may 
not shift on to labor but instead shift toward consumption in the pressure to maintain a 
balanced budget. Therefore, it is important to look at how economic integration 
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influences the tax rates of capital and labor as well as consumption. In addition, it is 
important to include both trade and factor flows in the analysis since both features of 
economic integration have possible channels to influence domestic tax rates. There has 
not been such a comprehensive empirical study. This paper pursues to do this. 
 
3   The data description 
 All the data are for OECD countries during the period of 1970 to 1995. The 
dependent variables in all estimations are the average effective tax rates on capital, labor, 
and consumption. Tax rates in the data set are in percentage points. These rates are 
defined and calculated in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).12  The countries that are 
included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
and New Zealand. The explanatory variables include the share of trade volume in GDP, 
net inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the share of foreign population in total 
population, GDP per capita, general government final consumption expenditure, general 
government gross financial liability, external risk, standard deviation of exchange risk, 
the share of labor force in total population, inflation rate, unemployment rate. All 
exchange rate data is on the base of US dollar. Thus, the U.S. is excluded from the data. 
The external risk variable is calculated according to Rodrik (1997). It is the standard 
deviation of the change in logarithm of the monthly spot rate multiplied by the share of 
                                                 
12 The updated version of the tax data is kindly made available on the web by Mendoza 
(http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/mendoza/). I also thank Francesco Daveri for providing me the extended 
periods of the tax rates data used in Daveri and Tabellini (2000). 
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trade.TP13 PT  It measures unanticipated income effects due to the exchange rate. The 
government liability data is taken from OECD economic outlook. The exchange rate data 
are obtained from Thomson Datastream. All other data are from World Development 
Indicators. The missing data are excluded, thus, the data set is an unbalanced panel data. 
The number of observation available varies for each regression, mostly contingent on the 
tax rate availability. 
 Table 1 provides the description of the variables, and Table 2 shows the summary 
statistics of the tax rates for each country. 
 
4   Specification and Estimation Strategy 
 We estimate the tax rates on capital, labor, and consumption separately. The 
explanatory variables are common to all regressions. The key explanatory variables that 
we are interested in are trade of goods and services, net FDI inflow, and foreign 
population. The basic specification is: 
kitititkit ZXTax εγβα +++=)2(  
where k  is each type of tax, i  is each country, and t  is each year. X contains trade, FDI, 
and foreign population. Z contains other control variables such as GDP per capita, 
government consumption, government debt, exchange rate volatility, inflation rate, and 
unemployment rate, and total population. 
 First, we estimate (2) using a fixed effects model assuming that unobserved 
shocks on the effective tax rates are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and that 
                                                 
TP
13
PT For the spot rate data, I thank Hannah Francis at Thomson Datastream. 
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they do not affect the tax rates in the following period. In other words, we assume there is 
no endogeneity problem and serial correlation. While these may be restrictive 
assumptions, they are simple and play a role as a first pass. Next, we pay some caution to 
a possible serial correlation in the error term in (2). Suppose the error term takes form as 
kitkitkit u+= −1)3( ερε  
where kitu  is white noise, and ρ  is significant. One possibility of the presence of serial 
correlation is that the equation (2) is miss-specified for omitting the lagged tax rate in the 
regressants. As Mendoza et al. (1994) shows, the trends of tax rates have some 
persistency over the period. Thus, capturing such a dynamic aspect may be more 
appropriate specification. We add the lagged tax rate in the equation (2) and estimate the 
following.  
kitkitititkit TaxZXTax εδγβα ++++= −1)4(  
The possible presence of serial correlation is also a problem especially when we suspect 
itX  is endogenous and correlated with the error term because this gives biased estimates. 
If the specification (4) is not suffered from serial correlation, then, the potential 
endogeneity problem can be solved by the instrumental variable estimation with the 
instrument being: 
ititit ebXaX ++= −1)5(  
If not, alternative estimation methods should be used such as the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression method or Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation method. 
Another alternative specification that is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is also 
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an option. In this case, it is assumed that the error term includes the individual specific 
term, which can be a cause of serial correlation. 
tiititititi uZXTaxTax ,,,1,,)6( ++++= − νγβδ  
Again because of serial correlation and the endogeneity problem in itX , we can not use a 
simple instrumental variable method with (5). Using the fixed or random effect 
estimation of (6) leads to biased estimates.TP14 PT Among others, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
developed a consistent and efficient estimation method, which uses a generalized method 
of moment (GMM) procedure with instruments. The basic estimation model takes first 
difference so as to remove the individual effect in (6). 
tiittititi uZXTaxTax ,,1,,)7( ∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ − γβδ  
where ∆  is the first difference operator. As the error term in (7) is still correlated with 
1, −∆ tiTax , instrumental variable technique is needed. Arellano and Bond (1991) argue 
that a dependent variable lagged two periods back and more can be used as instrumental 
variables in addition to exogenous variables ( Z ) to obtain unbiased β . 
  
5   Results 
 Table 3 shows the fixed effects estimates of the equation (2). Rodrik (1997) and 
European Commission (1997) made the argument previously that the increasing pressure 
of economic integration has shifted the tax burden from capital to labor. However, as 
discussed in the previous section, the feature of economic integration, flows of goods and 
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14
PT See Baltagi (2001) p130, Nickell (1981), Kiviet (1995) 
factor inputs, can theoretically lower the all corresponding tax rates. However, the result 
shows that trade is not associated with the capital tax rate or the labor tax rate at 
statistically significant levels. The factor flows, both capital and labor, are also 
insignificant in both the capital and labor tax equations. Moreover, the estimates do not 
show that the government shifts tax burden away from capital and into labor as Rodrik 
(1997) claimed. The only factor that reduces the capital tax, yet increases the labor tax 
rate is labor inflow measured in the share of foreign labor, though it is statistically 
insignificant. The consumption tax rate turns out to be the one most affected by economic 
integration. Trade volume, net inflow of FDI and the share of foreign population are all 
negatively associated with the consumption tax at statistically significant level. 
Especially the impact of foreign population is large. A 1 percent increase in the share 
leads to a near 0.9 percent reduction of the consumption tax rate. The channel at which 
capital and labor inflow reduce the consumption tax rate had not been explored deeply in 
the literature yet. Kanbur and Keen (1993), in their cross-border shopping competition 
model, claimed that a larger population leads to a higher consumption tax. Razin, Sadka, 
and Swagel (2002) found that an increase in foreign population leads to a lower labor tax, 
rather than a consumption tax, using the political economy model. We find no support on 
these claims. Rather, we believe, our results show the increasing pressure of economic 
integration lowers the optimal tax rates on capital, labor, and consumption. At the same 
time, the countries receiving the factor inputs from abroad were able to lower the tax 
rates. 
 Besides these three factors, the estimated coefficient of government liability is 
always significant and positive in all tax equations. This shows regardless of the size of 
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government, how its spending is financed matters in determining the effective tax rates. 
The failure to balance budgets by governments seems to ultimately raise the effective tax 
rates. The total population, the measure for the size of country used in the literature, has 
insignificant coefficients in the all tax equations. The unemployment rate is positively 
associated with the labor tax rate, but negatively associated with the capital tax rate. 
Higher unemployment rates lead to a higher labor tax rate, that is, laborers bear the 
burden by themselves. On the other hand, the owners of capital seem to have an ease of 
the tax burden during recessions when unemployment is high. The inflation rate is 
positive and significant in all three tax rates. One possibility of this is that inflation 
pushes the tax bracket of tax payers up raising the effective average tax rates. For capital 
and labor tax rates, the different rates among the countries are explained by government 
liability, government consumption, the inflation rate, and the unemployment rate rather 
than the flows of goods and services and production factors. For the consumption tax 
rate, the difference in the flows of goods and factor inputs among the countries, in 
addition to government debt, government consumption and the inflation rate, explains the 
difference in the average consumption tax rate. 
 With the concern of serial correlation, we estimated the autoregressive error term 
and turned out to be 0.73, 0.37, and 0.46 for the capital, labor, and the consumption tax 
equations respectively. These rather high values of the first order autocorrelation of the 
errors cast doubts that the lagged tax rates should be included in the regressants as in the 
equation (4). We provide the estimates of the equation (4) in the Table 4. The lagged tax 
rates are significant in all tax equations. The values are also significantly high ranging 
from 0.43 to 0.60 showing the strong dynamic persistent patterns of the tax rates. The 
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coefficients of interest, trade, net inflow of FDI, and the share of foreign labor, did not 
show drastic qualitative change from the previous estimations. Particularly, these 
coefficient estimates remain statistically significant in the consumption tax equation with 
all negative signs. The variables that explain the differences of the tax rates among the 
countries also are the same as in the previous model, and include government 
consumption, government liability, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate for the 
capital and labor taxes, and for the consumption tax, trade and factor flows are also 
included. The estimates of the first order autocorrelation diminish to 0.30, -0.06, and 0.10 
for the capital, labor and consumption tax equations respectively. With the statistically 
significant coefficient estimates of the lagged tax rates, the inclusions of the lagged tax 
rates appear more appropriate. Concerning the endogeneity problem of trade and factor 
flows in the equation, finding small autocorrelation of the error terms allow us to use the 
lagged endogenous variables as instrumental variables. We provide the results in the 
Table 5. The qualitative implications of trade and factor flows for the tax rates stay the 
same though, the significance of the coefficient estimates go away in the consumption tax 
equation. 
 The other method, the Arellano-Bond estimate, utilizes more instrumental 
variables by including more than one lag. The estimates are reported in the table 6. The 
lagged tax rates on capital, labor, and consumption have all significant coefficients and 
are positive as in the previous models. The estimate for the lagged capital tax rate is 0.57, 
higher than those of labor and consumption with 0.46 and 0.44 respectively. Thus, the 
capital tax rate seems to have a more persistent trend than the other two. Coefficients in 
this model provide the impact of newly added information. The estimated coefficients for 
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trade and factor flows are all insignificant in the capital and labor tax equations. Trade 
and FDI are significant in the consumption equation, but foreign population is 
insignificant while the signs are all negative as in the previous estimates. 
 All estimation models consistently show that trade and factor flows do not 
influence the effective tax rate on capital and labor at statistically significant levels. The 
coefficients of trade are mostly negative in all tax equations. This may indicate 
undermining government’s ability to levy taxes. However, we fail to provide the evidence 
of this in a statistically significant manner. The coefficients of trade and factor flows are, 
on the other hand, always negative, and mostly statistically significant. Therefore, the 
claim that increasing economic integration undermines domestic taxation may be applied 
correctly for consumption, but not for the taxation on production factors. 
 
6   Conclusion 
 In this study, we attempted to explain the different level and trend of tax rates 
among industrial countries by looking at their paths toward economic integration. The 
industrial countries, while they are all integrated with the world economy more or less, 
differ in the magnitude of their integration. Some countries are more dependent on trade 
in accruing incomes, absorbing the world capital, and opt to accept foreign labor while 
others are more regulatory and less connected with the outside economies. At the same 
time, these countries have exhibited different pattern of tax rates on capital, labor, and 
consumption. The trends of these tax rates also differ among the countries. 
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 The previous literature claimed these two, domestic taxation and economic 
integration, are linked. International trade is said to decrease the capital tax rate and 
increase the labor tax rate. Our study did not confirm the linkage between capital and 
labor tax rates and such features of economic integration. The difference in trade volume 
and flows of capital and labor across countries seems to be unable to explain the 
differences in the capital and labor tax rates across countries. Interestingly, the strong 
relation between economic integration and domestic taxation was found in the 
consumption tax rate. The previous empirical studies have missed this point. Actual 
linkage between the consumption tax and economic integration may be more complex 
than described here. Since governments can choose different sources to levy taxes, the 
pressures of economic integration put on the labor and capital market do not need to be 
realized in the taxations of the corresponding earnings. We believe that the wave of 
globalization and the benefits of labor and capital flows have fallen on the good market in 
the form of a lower consumption tax. 
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Table 1   Description of the variables. 
 
Variable Description 
captax the effective average capital tax rate 
labtax the effective average labor tax rate 
contax the effective average consumption tax rate 
tradegdp the share of trade volume in GDP 
nfdigdp the net inflow of foreign direct investment as a share of GDP 
fpop the share of foreign population in the total population 
tpopm total population in million 
gdppck GDP per capita in thousand dollars 
govcons General government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP 
govliabil general government gross financial liability as a share of GDP 
extrisk the external risk defined as the standard deviation of the change in the logarithm of monthly spot rate multiplied by the share of trade 
stdexch the standard deviation of monthly spot exchange rate 
inflation inflation rate 
unemploy unemployment rate 
Note: the tax rates are defined in Mendoza et al. (1994)
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Table 2   Summary Statistics of tax rates: Mean and Standard deviation over the period 
 
country captax labtax contax 
Australia 41.046 16.332 8.278
 (6.233) (3.176) (0.910)
Austria 21.132 37.411 20.616
 (2.045) (3.403) (1.227)
Belgium 34.959 42.759 17.239
 (5.116) (5.731) (0.957)
Canada 42.651 24.510 12.168
 (5.011) (5.192) (1.167)
Switzerland 23.718 28.366 7.357
 (4.961) (5.443) (0.676)
Germany 26.564 37.713 15.945
 (3.669) (4.456) (1.124)
Denmark 34.307 42.602 34.467
 (3.085) (2.454) (1.825)
Spain 15.509 30.248 10.080
 (4.747) (6.723) (2.836)
Finland 34.557 30.826 25.263
 (8.804) (7.443) (3.834)
France 23.989 40.689 20.011
 (3.839) (7.835) (2.559)
UK 54.713 25.114 15.009
 (9.472) (2.036) (2.051)
Italy 26.667 39.249 13.023
 (7.410) (6.658) (1.694)
Japan 35.243 22.371 5.334
 (9.871) (4.735) (0.550)
Netherlands 30.183 49.329 17.508
 (3.553) (5.879) (0.802)
Norway 36.212 38.244 33.149
 (6.849) (2.845) (4.295)
New Zealand 35.896 25.910 11.837
 (3.308) (1.130) (4.076)
Sweden 50.397 46.083 21.549
  (10.174) (5.701) (2.527)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3   Fixed Effect Estimations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 mcaptax mlabtax mcontax 
tradegdp -0.161 -0.088 -0.121 
 (1.18) (1.57) (3.29)*** 
nfdigdp 0.342 0.060 -0.606 
 (0.48) (0.21) (2.68)*** 
fpop -1.140 0.107 -0.885 
 (1.15) (0.26) (2.56)** 
gdppck -0.496 0.227 0.069 
 (1.14) (1.28) (0.45) 
govcons 1.059 -0.829 -0.457 
 (1.49) (2.86)*** (2.19)** 
govliabil 0.251 0.142 0.093 
 (4.64)*** (6.42)*** (5.20)*** 
extrisk -0.867 0.383 0.066 
 (0.88) (0.96) (0.22) 
stdexch 143.195 -37.715 -4.560 
 (1.74)* (1.12) (0.20) 
tpopm -0.719 -0.405 0.025 
 (0.65) (0.90) (0.07) 
inflation 1.139 0.320 0.284 
 (3.75)*** (2.58)** (2.81)*** 
unemploy -0.735 0.908 -0.068 
 (2.08)** (6.28)*** (0.46) 
Constant 52.332 52.362 30.554 
 (1.43) (3.50)*** (2.34)** 
Observations 113 113 89 
Number of 
country 
15 15 13 
Adj R-squrd 0.26 0.59 0.30 
AR(1) error 0.73 0.37 0.46 
 
Notes: 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses    






Table 4   Fixed effects with lagged tax rates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 mcaptax mlabtax mcontax 
tradegdp -0.049 -0.052 -0.091 
 (0.44) (1.05) (2.71)*** 
nfdigdp 0.332 -0.088 -0.585 
 (0.58) (0.35) (2.91)*** 
fpop -0.725 0.174 -0.667 
 (0.92) (0.50) (2.14)** 
gdppck -0.152 0.055 0.074 
 (0.44) (0.35) (0.55) 
govcons 0.298 -0.536 -0.551 
 (0.52) (2.11)** (2.95)*** 
govliabil 0.103 0.084 0.055 
 (2.17)** (3.95)*** (3.05)*** 
extrisk -0.908 0.246 -0.098 
 (1.14) (0.69) (0.37) 
stdexch 124.974 -21.615 9.324 
 (1.89)* (0.73) (0.45) 
tpopm -0.661 -0.155 -0.043 
 (0.76) (0.40) (0.13) 
inflation 0.149 0.275 0.186 
 (0.54) (2.56)** (2.01)** 
unemploy -0.749 0.661 0.011 
 (2.68)*** (4.98)*** (0.08) 
mcaptax1 0.605   
 (7.52)***   
mlabtax1  0.461  
  (5.70)***  
mcontax1   0.431 
   (4.28)*** 
Constant 39.167 27.240 26.302 
 (1.35) (2.01)** (2.26)** 
Observations 112 112 89 
Number of 
country 
15 15 13 
Adj R-squrd 0.55 0.70 0.45 
AR(1) error term 0.30 -0.06 0.10 
 
Notes: 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5   Instrumental Variable Estimation  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 mcaptax mlabtax mcontax 
tradegdp 1.014 -0.199 -0.042 
 (1.47) (1.06) (0.38) 
nfdigdp -0.135 0.357 -1.686 
 (0.04) (0.34) (1.13) 
fpop -2.402 0.710 -0.634 
 (1.49) (1.35) (0.76) 
gdppck 0.444 -0.139 0.190 
 (0.62) (0.59) (0.98) 
govcons 2.788 -0.910 -0.428 
 (1.52) (1.59) (1.15) 
govliabil -0.040 0.096 0.046 
 (0.33) (3.06)*** (1.80)* 
extrisk -3.929 0.675 -0.459 
 (1.78)* (1.04) (1.01) 
stdexch 312.937 -45.523 22.706 
 (1.96)* (0.95) (0.68) 
tpopm -0.782 0.089 -0.290 
 (0.45) (0.16) (0.68) 
inflation -0.457 0.286 0.233 
 (0.62) (1.68)* (1.32) 
unemploy -1.827 0.766 -0.104 
 (1.93)* (2.79)*** (0.55) 
mcaptax1 0.750   
 (4.65)***   
mlabtax1  0.452  
  (5.10)***  
mcontax1   0.443 
   (3.23)*** 
Constant 35.532 46.779 35.283 
 (0.17) (1.51) (0.75) 
Observations 108 108 85 
Adj R-squrd 0.80 0.98 0.99 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6 Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.mcaptax D.mlabtax D.mcontax 
D.tradegdp -0.025 -0.057 -0.091 
 (0.23) (1.07) (2.57)** 
D.nfdigdp 0.340 -0.090 -0.591 
 (0.64) (0.34) (2.95)*** 
D.fpop 0.175 0.042 -0.515 
 (0.21) (0.10) (1.36) 
D.tpopm -0.650 -0.157 -0.061 
 (0.78) (0.37) (0.18) 
D.gdppck 0.576 -0.052 0.186 
 (1.40) (0.25) (1.21) 
D.govcons 0.704 -0.580 -0.460 
 (1.28) (2.16)** (2.37)** 
D.govliabil 0.191 0.074 0.062 
 (3.52)*** (2.94)*** (3.37)*** 
D.extrisk -1.158 0.281 -0.050 
 (1.54) (0.75) (0.19) 
D.stdexch 134.703 -22.679 3.485 
 (2.16)** (0.72) (0.17) 
D.inflation 0.052 0.303 0.146 
 (0.19) (2.49)** (1.37) 
D.unemploy -0.858 0.675 -0.042 
 (3.24)*** (4.80)*** (0.29) 
LD.mcaptax 0.539   
 (6.72)***   
LD.mlabtax  0.463  
  (5.54)***  
LD.mcontax   0.437 
   (4.38)*** 
Constant -0.758*** 0.106 -0.117 
 (2.82) (0.82) (1.14) 
Observations 96 96 75 
Number of country 11 11 11 
 
 
Notes: refer the equation (7). 
D. denotes the first difference 
LD. denotes the lagged first difference 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 








The Search of Heterogeneous Impacts of Trade Barriers across Regions in the U.S. 
 
1. Introduction 
 In the traditional trade theory, an economy is assumed to be integrated throughout 
regions. This means that the same technology is available throughout regions; capital is 
freely mobile within a country; and workers across skills can move between regions at a 
sufficiently low cost in a short period of time. Therefore, there is a unique factor 
abundance and relative factor price within a country. If one region observes higher or 
lower relative factor price than other regions, it ought to be temporary while factor 
reallocation takes place. International trade occurs due to differences in technology and 
factor abundance between countries. 
 A few studies have focused heterogeneous factor distribution within a country and 
its relationship with international trade. Courant and Deardorff (1992) describe uneven 
distribution of production factors as “lumpiness”, and showed that trade pattern of lumpy 
country deviates from the traditional trade theory. There hasn’t been any empirical 
scrutiny on lumpiness until recently. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2001) provided the 
evidence of the lumpiness in the case of the United States by showing relative factor 
price is significantly different across regions. Bernard, Redding, Schott, and Simpson 
(2002) found the evidence of the lumpiness in the case of the United Kingdom. Most 
recently, Bernard, Robertson, and Schott (2004) found lumpiness in Mexico. If, in fact, 
factor abundance is sufficiently different across regions within a country, the bundle of 
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goods with comparative advantage is not same across regions. Therefore, the change in 
tariff and other trade barriers should have different impacts between regions. 
 Alternatively, Melvin (1985) considers the case where large inter-regional 
transportation cost deters regional trade and replaces with international trade. In this case, 
even if regional factor allocation is not lumpy, regions will have different bundles of 
goods with comparative advantage unless factor allocations are the exactly same across 
the regions. Then again, there will be differential regional impacts of trade barriers. 
 Thus, in this paper, we investigate whether tariffs and non-tariff barriers have 
affected wages of the regions differently for the case of the United States. Based on the 
F-test where the null hypothesis is that tariffs and non-tariff barriers, both jointly, have no 
regional impact on wages, we reject the null and find there are heterogeneous regional 
impacts of trade barriers on wages. We also conduct the F-test for each tariffs and non-
tariff barriers separately of which the null is that each has homogeneous impact on wages 
across the regions. The separate test seems to make sense since the measurements of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers we used are different. Particularly, we use the coverage ratio 
as the proxy for non-tariff barrier. Unlike the tariff measure, it does not reveal the 
magnitude of the trade barrier in terms of its effect on domestic price. Once again, we 
find that tariffs and non-tariff barriers have regional impacts that are different across the 
regions. However, when we look into each region’s coefficient estimate of the impact of 
trade barriers on wages, the picture seems puzzling. We find very few regions, if in fact 
there are, had heterogeneous regional impacts of trade barriers. The number of regions 
with distinct trade effects was about 5 percent (with statistical significance level of 5 
percent) of the Metropolitan Statistical Area that are examined for tariffs and Non-Tariff 
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Barriers together (10 percent of the regions with 10 percent statistical significance level). 
Therefore, we conclude that while there may be some degree of heterogeneous regional 
effects of trade barriers, the evidence is rather weak. In terms of the impacts of trade 
barriers, we may go further to say that the labor markets in the U.S. are highly, if not 
completely, integrated. 
 This is the first attempt in literature to empirically examine regional impacts of 
trade barriers on wages, and we urge others to take a closer look at the issue. If in fact, 
the heterogeneous regional impacts exist, in assessing the welfare effect of trade policies, 
one should take into consideration the regional redistribution of real income for each 
factor along with the redistribution among the factors. While we provide the two potential 
reasons why trade barriers may have regional impacts, we do not test the cause(s) of this, 
i.e. whether it is due lumpiness or transportation cost. We provide the discussions on the 
cause(s) based on our results. However, we leave more rigorous investigation in 
identifying the cause(s) of differential regional impact of trade barriers for future. 
 The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 provides the literature 
review primarily on the theoretical development of regional analysis of international 
trade. Section 3 describes the data and estimation model we employ, following the results 
and discussion in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Literature review 
 The traditional international trade theory abstracts from differences in consumers’ 
income and taste, and access to technology and resources across regions within a country. 
Therefore, a country is assumed to have uniform distribution of factor endowments and 
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identical factor prices as all regions specialize in production of the same set of goods and 
services. It is the differences among countries in factor endowment and technology that 
create international trade. Therefore, the regional implications of international trade and 
trade policy have been ignored in such a framework. A few studies have broken the 
conventional assumptions and provided the analysis of regional effects of international 
trade. Courant and Deardorff (1992) consider the case where production factors are 
unevenly distributed across regions. Melvin (1985) analyzes the case where 
transportation cost is high enough to deter regional trade of goods and services. In both 
scenarios, trade has distinct implications across regions within a country. Trade policy 
can create winners in one region and losers in another region even for the owner of the 
same factor. In the following, we provide brief summary and implication of each theory. 
 Courant and Deardorff (1992) identify an alternative determinant of international 
trade that is intranatioinal difference in factor endowment. They develop the theory in 
which uneven distribution of factor endowments leads to international trade in the two 
good, two factor, and two region framework. The uneven distribution of factors is dubbed 
as “lumpiness” and can be described in the following Edgeworth Box diagram with two 
regions A and B and two factors, capital and labor.  and  are the factor intensities 
that correspond to the least cost production techniques for good X and Y respectively 
given their world prices. X is assumed to be labor intensive while Y capital intensive. 
Within the parallelogram , both regions produce both goods X and Y, thus it is 
the area of incomplete specialization. The area is called Factor Price Equalization (FPE) 
parallelogram as factor prices are equalized between two regions within the area 




parallelogram is contingent to consumers’ taste and income, production technology, and 
the world prices of traded goods. 
[Graph 1] 
In the area I and II, labor is unevenly distributed to region A while region B has 
disproportional labor endowment in the area V and VI. Thus, labor is a lumpy factor. 
Similarly, in the area III, IV, VI, and VII, lumpy factor is capital. When factor allocation 
is in the area I, region A completely specializes in producing good Y, while region B 
produces both goods. As region B is endowed with disproportional amount of labor, the 
country as a whole produces disproportionately more good X than people consume, 
hence, exports good X and imports good Y. In this manner, Courant and Deardorff 
(1992) showed that the country exports good X when the factor allocation is in the area I, 
II, V, and VI while it exports good Y in the area III, IV, VII, and VI. As they put it,  
“the country tends to export the good that uses relatively intensively the factor that is 
more unevenly distributed across regions.” 
We should also note that in the area I and V, one region specializes in good X while the 
other region produces both good. In the area IV and VII, one region produces only good 
Y while the other region produces both good. On the other hand, in the area II, III, VI, 
each region specializes in only one good. For instance, in the area II, region A specializes 
in good Y while region B specializes in good X. This distinction between complete 
specialization of both region versus that of one region becomes crucial later in the 
empirical work. 
 Whether such lumpiness is actually prominent phenomenon is an empirical 
question which a few tried to answer recently. As mentioned above, factor price is 
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equalized within the FPE parallelogram. Thus, if one finds the evidence against factor 
price equalization, then, factor allocation should be in the lumpy area. Bernard, Jensen, 
and Schott (2001) find the evidence of variations in factor prices across regions in the 
case of the U.S. They claim that there are at least three cones which have different 
relative wage rates and that in 83 out of 181 regions, the relative wage deviates from the 
rest of the regions. From this evidence, they claim that the factor allocation in the U.S. is 
lumpy (uneven). For other parts of the world, Bernard, Redding, Schott, and Simpson 
(2002) study the case in the United Kingdom. and find the evidence against the relative 
factor price equalization. Thus, factor abundance is not uniform within the United 
Kingdom.15  Bernard, Robertson, and Schott (2004) find the evidence in favor of 
lumpiness in the case of Mexico. 
 If in fact, factors are significantly unevenly distributed across regions, the 
implication of trade policy such as tariffs is quite different from the conventional one. 
Back to the Edgeworth Box above, if labor is lumpy as in the area I, the country as a 
whole imports good Y, thus, tariff will be imposed on good Y. The effect of the tariff, 
however, is different between regions A and B. Note, before the tariff is imposed, the 
wage rate in region A is higher than in the region B. The factor prices of region B are 
equivalent to the world factor prices. The region A, scarce in labor, uses higher capital-
labor ratio in producing good Y than would the factor intensity be prevailed under 
nonspecialization. The tariff on good Y will now raise the relative price of good Y, thus, 
increase the return to labor (as well as capital) in region A. On the other hand, the usual 
Stolper-Samuelson theory applies to region B. The return to capital increases and the 
                                                 
15 However, Debaere (2004) finds that the difference in factor distribution across the regions in the United 
Kingdom and Japan is not sufficiently large enough to cause the regions to have different specialization of 
production at different factor prices. 
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return to labor decreases as the price of capital intensive good increases. Therefore, we 
observe a distinct regional effect of tariff: laborers in region A gain while laborers in 
region B (even those producing the same good as in region A) lose. This heterogeneity of 
regional impact of trade persists until enough of factors shifts so that the allocation moves 
into the FPE parallelogram. 
The alternative exploration of regional impacts of international trade is done by 
Melvin (1985). It introduces transportation cost between regions within a country that is 
so high that regional trade is replaced with international trade. For instance, if 
transporting commodities from west coast to east coast in the US is more expensive than 
bringing goods from Canada or Mexico, international trade would take place even if the 
factor abundance and production technology for Canada and Mexico were the same with 
the US. The case can be described with the two regional production possibility curves 
(PPC) in the graph 2. 
[Graph 2] 
X is continuously assumed to be a labor intensive good while Y to be a capital intensive 
good. Region W is assumed to be more labor abundant, thus, has more capability to 
produce good X than region E as shown in the graph. Two regions have a same 
preference in consumption. Thus, they have an identical optimal consumption ratio of 
good X and Y. The equilibrium production points for region E and W are denoted as EP  
and WP  respectively. The equilibrium consumption point is denoted as A for given the 
world price. Because of high regional transportation cost, regional economies of E and W 
are independent and regional trade does not occur despite the fact that the demand of 
good X in region E exceeds its own supply and likewise the demand of good Y in region 
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W exceeds its own supply. Instead, region E exports good Y to the rest of the world and 
imports good X, while region W exports good X and imports good Y from abroad. The 
factor price is identical between two regions at this moment as they face the same world 
prices of the goods vis-à-vis the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, the imposition of 
a tariff has a different impact on the factor price between the regions since it changes the 
relative price of the goods in two regions. Suppose that trade volume of region W is 
greater than that of region E, thus, the country imposes the tariff on good Y. Note that 
only region W imports good Y. Thus, the relative price of good X to Y decreases in 
region W, but stays same in region E (where it continuously exports good Y at the world 
price). The new production point for region W is denoted as , and the consumption 
point as B. The factor reward to labor (only) in region W decreases while that in region E 
is unaffected. Note that laborers producing the same good now face different factor 
rewards across regions. Therefore, tariff has distinct impacts among regions in a country. 
As Melvin (1985) generalizes it in a proposition, 
W
tP
 “If regions have different trade patterns, any tariff will generate interregional 
differences in real factor rewards. The abundant factor in each region will lose 
relatively and absolutely.” 
In the next section, we provide the empirical setup which we test whether trade policy has 
differentiated impact on factor rewards (of labor) across regions in the US. 
 
3.   Data and Estimation Strategy 
  We use the wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of 
Employment and wages. This provides the annual wage per employee between 1990 and 
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2001 in the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) across the industries of NAICS (the 
North American Industry Classification System). There are currently 370 MSA in the 
U.S. Each MSA contains at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more inhabitants. There 
is a high degree of economic and social integration among the communities in each 
MSA. Among 370 MSA, 369 were available for the wage data. Table 1 lists the regions 
in our sample. 
[Table 1] 
 We transform the data into the average annual wage based on two digit SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification) of which the NAICS-SIC concordance is available. This leads 
us 27 industries across 369 MSA regions throughout the year of 1990 to 2001. The 
purpose of aggregating at two digit level is to avoid double counting workers, for 
example, those who produce both “livestock such as beef and hog” (SIC 021) and those 
who produce “poultry and eggs” (SIC 025). The US tariff data is available based on the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) for the years 1989 to 2001, which Feenstra, Romalis, 
and Schott (2002) provides.16  The Most Favored Nation rate is used for the tariff 
measure in the estimation. The Non-Tariff Barrier (NTB) data is available for 1993 to 
2000 by Jon Haveman who constructed the database using UNCTAD TRAIN.17  We 
calculate the coverage ratio as the measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers. The coverage 
ratio is the portion of imports in a particular sector that are subject to at least one NTB. 
The concordance with SIC, NAICS, and HTS codes are available by Raymond 
                                                 
16 John Romalis generously provides the data at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/john.romalis/research/ 
17 The Ultimate Trade Barrier Catalog versions 3 is made available at http://www.eiit.org/Protection/ 
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Robertson.TP18 PT  We integrated the data on wage, tariff, and NTB based on two digit SIC. 
Due to the limitation of the concordance between SIC and HTS, we have the industries 
up to SIC 39. We provide the summary statistics in Table 2 for the wage ratio, tariffs, and 
NTBs across industry. 
[Table 2] 
The variations of tariffs and NTBs are over the years while the variation of relative wages 
is across years and regions. The means of tariffs range from 0 percent in several 
industries to 12.6 percent, the highest in Apparel and Textile product industry. The means 
of NTBs coverage ratio range from 0 percent in several industries to 62.3 percent, again 
the highest in Apparel and Textile product industry. The highest average wage was found 
in the Metal Mining industry being more than twice as large as its national average. The 
lowest was found in Agricultural Production of Crops industry with about a half the 
national average. 
 To test if trade barriers have a differential effect on wages across regions in the 













where we define the relative wage ratio as the wage for a particular industry and year and 




WageRWR = .   The subscripts r, i, and t represent region, industry, and year.  
rD  is the regional dummy. iD  is the industry dummy. r1α  measures regional fixed 
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effects that are independent of industry and year. The wage in a certain region may be 
higher or lower than the national average. A region’s amenities may prevent labor 
mobility which eliminates wage discrepancy. Or, regional education that deviates from its 
national level may make labor more productive compared to the national level. i2α  
measures industry specific features that raise or lower the wage rate in certain industry 
apart from the national average wage. This may be due to high/low value added 
characteristics of products produced in an industry or due to other production factors such 
as capital that differentiate marginal product of labor. 3α  and 4α  are the effect of tariffs 
and NTBs on wages for a base region and a base industry. i5α  and i6α  are the industry 
specific effects of tariffs and NTBs on wages that are on the top of the effects of the base 
industry. 
 Our main concerns are r7α  and r8α . The interaction terms of the region dummy, 
rD , with tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB), itTariff  and itNTB , capture the effect of 
tariff and NTB that are specific to any region. As discussed in the previous section, if 
regional transportation cost is low enough and/or factor allocation is not lumpy, the 
impact of trade policies should be homogenous across the regions. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity of the impact of trade barriers throughout regions can be 
stated as 087 == rr αα  for all regions. If the null is accepted, the differences in factor 
prices and factor abundance across the regions found in the previous literature are not 
significantly different enough to have heterogeneous impacts of trade policy across 
regions. Furthermore, the transportation costs of commodities within the U.S. are not 
significantly high to deter the regional trade. On the other hand, if the null is rejected, the 
trade barriers’ impacts are not the same among regions. The change in tariff rates leads a 
particular skill of workers to be better off in one region, and the same skill workers worse 
off in other regions. In this case, the national trade policy has an uneven distributional 
effect not only among skill workers, but also among regions. The traditional winner/loser 
argument of trade policy based on the owners of factors should be extended to regions so 
as to incorporate regional redistribution. The assessment of the welfare analysis of trade 
policy becomes much more complex. 
 Before we proceed to the regression results, we make a few notes on the 
estimation in conjunction with the theories introduced in the previous section. For the 
lumpiness model by Courant and Deardorff (1992), in a two-good two-region world, if 
factor allocation is such as in the area II, III, or VI in the graph 1, two regions do not 
share the production bundle at all. Thus, in our estimation model, there can not be any 
comparable wage. We believe that we can exclude such extreme cases as we deal with 
more comprehensive regions and industries in the United States. For the transportation 
cost model by Melvin (1985), the regions that share borders with Mexico and Canada are 
expected to have differential impacts of trade barriers compared to other regions as those 
regions are thought to face much lower international transportation cost than inter-
regional transportation cost. 
 
4.   Results and Discussion 
 Due to three dimension data with region, year, and industry, a base region and a 
base industry must be chosen. The selection of a base region may require some caution 
since we will test whether all but the base region have the same impacts of trade barriers 
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as does the base region.TP19 PT  We first pick a base region randomly and run the regression. It 
is found that the region with the median value of coefficients r7α  and r8α  is 
Harrisonburg, Virginia. Next, we use Harrisonburg as the base region and run the same 
regression model. The interpretation of all the coefficients, r7α  and r8α , become relative 
to Harrisonburg. If all the regions cluster close enough to the base region in terms of the 
effects of trade barriers on wages, then, r7α  and r8α  will be statistically insignificant. On 
the other hand, if a certain group of regions have had differential impacts of trade 
barriers, the coefficients of those regions are expected to be statistically significant.TP20 PT 
While the sign of these coefficients is not crucial in testing the homogeneous effect of 
trade barriers, a positive coefficient of a region indicates that the region gains from trade 
barriers more than the base region, Harrisonburg, Virginia. On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient indicates that the region incurs losses due to trade barriers compared to the 
base region. There are 320 coefficients of r7α , the region specific effect of tariff, and 342 
coefficients of r8α , the region specific effect of NTB. Here, we should note that the 
coefficients of tariffs are not comparable to the coefficients of NTB. Our tariff measure is 
ad valorem rate which is the portion of a unit price. On the other hand, our NTB measure, 
a coverage ratio does not tell its trade barrier in terms of a portion of a price. For the tariff 
term, 12 out of 320 regions are significant at least at the 10 percent level. Of those, 4 are 
significant at the 1 percent level. These MSA include Ames, Iowa; Duluth, Minnesota 
and Wisconsin; Jackson, Tennessee; and Lake Charles, Louisiana. Another 3 regions are 
                                                 
TP
19
PT  The selection of a base industry is, on the other hand, less problematic as the industry specific effect of 
trade barriers are more of control factors in our paper. 
TP
20
PT  Technically a base region can be any region in the sample. Here, we postulate that all regions are 
homogenous and they cluster together close enough in terms of factor abundance, and thus, the impacts of 
trade barriers. Based on this presumption, the method is intended to provide the fewest regions with 
statistically significant coefficients. For this part, I am indebted to Strat Douglas. 
significant at the 5 percent level, which include Bloomington-Normal, Illinois; 
Parkersburg-Marietta, West Virginia and Ohio; and San Angelo, Texas. Of seven regions 
with at least a 5 percent significance level, Ames, Iowa and Bloomington-Normal Illinois 
had negative coefficients while the other five had positive coefficients. The largest 
negative significant coefficient was – 33 in Ames, Iowa. With the increase (decrease) in 
tariff by 1 percentage point, the relative wage is lowered (increased) by 0.33 compared to 
the base region, Harrisonburg, Virginia. The largest positive significant coefficient was 
32.8 in Jackson, Tennessee. Again, the 1 percentage point increase (decrease) in (all) 
tariff will raise (lower) the relative wage in Jackson by 0.328 compared to that in 
Harrisonburg.  
 For the NTB term, 21 out of 342 regions are significant at least at the 10 percent 
level. Of those, four are significant at the 1 percent level. These MSA include Ames, 
Iowa; Duluth, Minnesota and Wisconsin; Fargo, North Dakota and Minnesota; and 
Racine, Wisconsin. Another eleven regions are significant at the 5 percent level. Those 
include Bay City, Michigan; Bloomington, Indiana; Boulder, Colorado; Canton-
Massillon, Ohio; Danville, Illinois; Kalamazoo-Portage, Michigan; Lafayette, Indiana; 
Niles-Benton Harbor, Michigan; San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, California; Syracuse, 
New York; Tulsa, Oklahoma. About one half of the regions have positive coefficients 
and the other half negative. The largest positive significant coefficient is 3.797 in Duluth, 
Minnesota and Wisconsin. A 10 percentage point increase (decrease) in the coverage 
ratio will increase (decrease) the relative wage in Duluth by 0.38 compared to that in 
Harrisonburg. The largest negative significant coefficient is – 2.219 in Bloomington, 
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Indiana. A 10 percentage point increase (decrease) in the coverage ratio will decrease 
(increase) the relative wage in Bloomington by 0.22 compared to that in Harrisonburg.  
 When looking at each coefficient estimate of the regions discussed above, one 
finds few regions with statistically significant estimates. For the purpose of the analysis 
to test if no region has differential impacts from trade barriers, an F-test is conducted. 
The joint F-test of 087 == rr αα  for all regions is rejected at less than 1 percent 
significance level with an F-statistics of 3.18. Therefore, the notion that tariff and NTB 
have had homogenous impacts among the regions in the U.S. between 1993 and 2000 is 
rejected. This leaves a somewhat puzzling fact in which the F-test indicates there are 
heterogeneous regional impacts while individual regional coefficient estimates indicate 
there is not much of regional impact. While the joint F-test above focuses the trade 
barriers all together, it should be noted that there is clear distinction in our measurements 
between tariff and NTB. The magnitude of a trade barrier by a tariff is measured with ad 
valorem equivalent rate which is in terms of the proportion of the domestic price. On the 
other hand, the coverage ratio, our measure of a NTB, is the portion of imports that are 
subject to NTB, and it does not tell the magnitude of the trade barrier in terms of the 
portion of domestic price. For this reason, we also tested separately for tariffs and NTBs 
if each has had homogeneous regional impacts. In other words, we tested two null 
hypotheses, 07 =rα   and 08 =rα  separately. We found that both are rejected at less than 
the 1 percent significance level with F-statistics of 4.02 and 2.01 respectively. Thus, even 
when tariffs and NTBs are analyzed separately by acknowledging two distinct 
measurements, it is still found that the impacts of trade barriers are heterogeneous across 
the regions. 
 In Bernard, Jensen, Schott (2001), about 46 percent of the Labor Market Area 
(LMA) in the United States is found to have different relative wage rates in 1992. About 
the half of the sample regions had different wage rates from the overall U.S. rate at 10 
percent significant level. However, they also found that between 1972 and 1992, the 
discrepancy of wages among the regions narrowed. If this trend has continued during our 
sample period of 1993 to 2000, the fact that we found very little regions with differential 
regional impacts of trade barriers may reflect this narrowing trend of the discrepancy 
among the regions. 
 Although our empirical study is not meant to identify the cause of heterogeneous 
impacts of trade barriers, we provide some implication of our results regarding the 
theories discussed previously. In Melvin (1985), the cause of differential trade patterns 
across regions is high inter-regional transportation cost relative to international 
transportation cost. The regions bordering Mexico and Canada are thus expected to have 
different trade pattern than the rest of the regions in the U.S. Those regions include ones 
in the states such as Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.21 In our sample regions, there are 149 (out of 369) 
regions that are located in these seventeen states. They are expected to have differential 
impacts of trade barriers from the rest of the regions since the cost of transporting goods 
to Mexico or Canada for these regions may be much lower than domestic transportation 
costs. Among 33 coefficients found significant with at least at the 10 percent level, 17 
regions belong to the 17 states mentioned above. Other 16 coefficients are found in the 
                                                 
21 Of course one should proceed more rigorous investigation involved with geographic analysis to define 
the border regions and the non-border regions. 
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states such as Illinois, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Colorado, and 
Iowa. Approximately 11.4 percent of the border regions (17 out of 149 regions) have 
significant coefficients, while about 7.3 percent of the non-border regions (16 out of 220 
regions) have significant coefficients. Are the two numbers 11.4 and 7.3 statistically 
different? Is the percentage for the border regions larger than that for the non-border 
regions and enough to be able to distinguish the former from the latter as Melvin (1985) 
predicts? Cox (1987) summarizes a test statistic that allows us to examine the statistical 
difference between two proportions. The test statistic follows the normal distribution and 








where 1p  and 2p  are the two proportions, 11.4 percent and 7.3 percent. 1n  and 2n  are 
the sample size, 149 and 220 regions respectively. p is the total proportion of the regions 
that have significant coefficients, that is 8.9 percent (33 out of 369 regions). The null 
hypothesis is that the proportion of significant coefficients in the border regions is less 
than or same as that in the non-border regions. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
border regions have a larger proportion of regions with significant coefficients. The 
calculated test statistic is 1.366 and the p-value is 0.0859. We can reject the null at the 10 
percent with a one-tailed test. Thus, there seems to be the evidence that the border 
regions have differential impacts of trade barriers compared to the rest of the regions as 
Melvin (1985) hypothesized. 
The alternative theory, Courant and Deardorff (1992) and more recent Bernard, 
Jensen, and Schott (2001), relies on the fact that factor abundance varies across the 
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regions and the regions belong in different cones. To examine whether this is a cause of 
differential impacts of trade barriers, one need to examine the factor abundance and the 
bundles of goods with specialization for the regions our study finds to have significant 
coefficients. This is left for future research. 
A brief examination of other coefficients in the estimation is provided below. 
About one fifth of the regional dummy, r1α , are significant with at least at the 5 percent 
level. This regional fixed effects goes beyond industry fixed effects and the trade barriers 
effects on wages. Such wage deviation that goes beyond industrial structure in each 
region may stem from regional amenity that can differentiate the wages or labor 
immobility that wage differences alone do not motivate people to change their habitation. 
Fifty-three regions have negative coefficients while eleven are positive. The base region 
is Harrisonburg, Virginia. Thus, the regions with negative coefficients have the wage 
rates on average below that in Harrisonburg, while the opposite is true for the regions 
with positive coefficients. Sixteen of the industry dummies, i2α , are statistically 
significant, of which three are negative and 13 are positive. The base industry is SIC code 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries, which include manufacturing of jewelry, 
musical instruments, toys, and office supplies. Compared to the wage rates in this 
category, the industries with negative coefficients have lower wages on average.  These 
include Agricultural production of crops and livestock and forestry industry. The 
industries that had higher wages than the base industry are Industrial Machinery 
Equipment and Electronic Equipment, Chemical, Petroleum, and Coal Product, Mining, 
Paper Product, etc. 
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 The industry interaction term with trade barriers, i5α  and i6α  measures the 
impacts of trade barriers that are specific to industries. Four industries are found 
statistically significant in i5α , tariff term, two positive and the other two negative. The 
industries with negative coefficients, Electronic Equipment and Instruments and Related 
Products, have not gained from tariffs on average compared to the base industry, while 
the industries with positive coefficients, Metal Mining and Paper and Allied Products, 
gained more. For NTB term, i6α , one was found statistically significant and negative in 
Metal Mining industry. In principle, the same percentage change in goods price due to 
tariffs are expected to provide the equal gain in revenue per unit and if every industry 
passes the gain to laborers in the same manner, there should not be any industry specific 
impacts of trade barriers. The fact that we found several significant coefficients of these 
may be representing the different structure of industry in a way that they pass gains to 
laborers. For NTB, Metal Mining industry, one found significant, may have differentiated 
impact of trade barriers on its product price, and thus, differential impact on wages. Much 
of the details of these, however, should be considered with industrial and market 
structures. The lists of the estimates of i5α  and i6α  are in the Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 Conventionally, trade economists have treated a country as a point without space. 
In other word, we assumed factors of production are perfectly mobile between regions 
within a country, and same production technologies are equally available among the 
regions. Consumers’ taste of goods and services and their incomes are also assumed to be 
identical across the regions. Under these assumptions, there is no need to consider 
regional effects of trade since it affects all regions equally. The conventional focus of 
how trade influences a country was, hence, its impacts on factors or a nation as a whole. 
Likewise, the effects of tariff and other trade policies are assumed to be homogenous 
within a country. A couple literatures provide the theoretical rationales on how 
international trade can affect regions differently. First, Courant and Deardorff (1992) 
explain how factor allocation among regions can be a key determinant of what goods the 
country produces and trades with the rest of the world. That is, when resources are 
distributed unevenly across regions, the regions will have comparative advantage on 
different sets of goods. Second, Melvin (1985) studies the case where regional economies 
face such high transportation cost that it replaces regional trade with international trade. It 
shows regions will have different trade patterns unless resource allocation is exactly 
identical among the regions. In both cases, tariff and other trade barriers affect regions 
differently. The reward to the same factor can increase in one region and decrease in 
another region due to changes in trade policies. This paper is motivated by these 
theoretical developments as well as the recent empirical evidences of uneven factor 
allocation. We conduct the empirical scrutiny on whether trade policies have affected US 
regions differently. We use both tariff and Non-Tariff Barrier (NTB) measure to reflect 
the recent increase in the importance of the NTB as trade barriers. Our results provide 
some evidence, though weak, that both tariff and NTB had different impacts on wages 
across the regions. This indicates that trade policy creates gains and losses for the same 
factor owners across different regions. The number of regions with distinct impacts from 
NTB exceeds the respective number for tariff showing an increasing role of NTB over 
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tariff in the protection of domestic firms. The evidence is weak when one looks into 
individual coefficient estimates of each region as it seems that there are very few regions, 
if any, that have differential impacts of trade barriers. This may possibly indicate that the 
U.S. labor markets in the examined regions are more highly if not completely integrated 
than previously thought concerning the impacts of international trade. In fact, Debaere 
(2004) finds that the factor allocation is quite even in the case of the United Kingdom and 
Japan, in which case trade barriers should not have any regional impact. Is the United 
States different? Our study is the first attempt in the literature to examine whether trade 
barriers affect domestic regions differently, and more research is desired in future. One 
way of extension in this study is to employ an alternative empirical model by examining 
whether the share of labor income is equalized across regions and whether trade barriers 
have created the difference in the share of labor income across regions. The method is 
proposed in Bernard et al. (2001) and, though a CES production function is assumed, it 
provides an alternative empirical examination. 
 Finally, in our study, we demonstrated the existence of regional impacts of trade 
policies. However, we did not examine whether the losses from trade barriers are borne 
by the owners of the abundant factor in each region as the previous theoretical studies 
have indicated. The question has to be answered in conjunction with the recent empirical 
evidence of the uneven factor distribution and the failure of Factor Price Equalization. In 
addition, we did not test whether this is due lumpiness of factor allocation or 
transportation cost that resulted in the regional impacts of trade barriers. These questions 

















































































Table 1   The list of US regions 
1 Abilene    TX  26 Baltimore-Towson    MD  51 Burlington    NC  
2 Aguadilla-Isabela-San Sebastián    PR  27 Bangor    ME  52 Burlington-South Burlington    VT  
3 Akron    OH  28 Barnstable Town    MA  53 Canton-Massillon    OH  
4 Albany    GA  29 Baton Rouge    LA  54 Cape Coral-Fort Myers    FL  
5 Albany-Schenectady-Troy    NY  30 Battle Creek    MI  55 Carson City    NV  
6 Albuquerque    NM  31 Bay City    MI  56 Casper    WY  
7 Alexandria    LA  32 Beaumont-Port Arthur    TX  57 Cedar Rapids    IA  
8 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton    PA-NJ  33 Bellingham    WA  58 Champaign-Urbana    IL  
9 Altoona    PA  34 Bend    OR  59 Charleston    WV  
10 Amarillo    TX  35 Billings    MT  60 Charleston-North Charleston    SC  
11 Ames    IA  36 Binghamton    NY  61 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord    NC-SC  
12 Anchorage    AK  37 Birmingham-Hoover    AL  62 Charlottesville    VA  
13 Anderson    IN  38 Bismarck    ND  63 Chattanooga    TN-GA  
14 Anderson    SC  39 Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford    VA  64 Cheyenne    WY  
15 Ann Arbor    MI  40 Bloomington    IN  65 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet    IL-IN-WI  
16 Anniston-Oxford    AL  41 Bloomington-Normal    IL  66 Chico    CA  
17 Appleton    WI  42 Boise City-Nampa    ID  67 Cincinnati-Middletown    OH-KY-IN  
18 Asheville    NC  43 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy    MA-NH  68 Clarksville    TN-KY  
19 Athens-Clarke County    GA  44 Boulder    CO  69 Cleveland    TN  
20 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta    GA  45 Bowling Green    KY  70 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor    OH  
21 Atlantic City    NJ  46 Bremerton-Silverdale    WA  71 Coeur d'Alene    ID  
22 Auburn-Opelika    AL  47 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk    CT  72 College Station-Bryan    TX  
23 Augusta-Richmond County    GA-SC  48 Brownsville-Harlingen    TX  73 Colorado Springs    CO  
24 Austin-Round Rock    TX  49 Brunswick    GA  74 Columbia    MO  
25 Bakersfield    CA  50 Buffalo-Niagara Falls    NY  75 Columbia    SC  
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76 Columbus    GA-AL  101 Elizabethtown    KY  126 Gainesville    GA  
77 Columbus    IN  102 Elkhart-Goshen    IN  127 Glens Falls    NY  
78 Columbus    OH  103 Elmira    NY  128 Goldsboro    NC  
79 Corpus Christi    TX  104 El Paso    TX  129 Grand Forks    ND-MN  
80 Corvallis    OR  105 Erie    PA  130 Grand Junction    CO  
81 Cumberland    MD-WV  106 Eugene-Springfield    OR  131 Grand Rapids-Wyoming    MI  
82 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington    TX  107 Evansville    IN-KY  132 Great Falls    MT  
83 Dalton    GA  108 Fairbanks    AK  133 Greeley    CO  
84 Danville    IL  109 Fajardo    PR  134 Green Bay    WI  
85 Danville    VA  110 Fargo    ND-MN  135 Greensboro-High Point    NC  
86 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island    IA-IL  111 Farmington    NM  136 Greenville    NC  
87 Dayton    OH  112 Fayetteville    NC  137 Greenville    SC  
88 Decatur    AL  113 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers    AR-MO  138 Guayama    PR  
89 Decatur    IL  114 Flagstaff    AZ  139 Gulfport-Biloxi    MS  
90 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach    FL  115 Flint    MI  140 Hagerstown-Martinsburg    MD-WV  
91 Denver-Aurora    CO  116 Florence    SC  141 Hanford-Corcoran    CA  
92 Des Moines    IA  117 Florence-Muscle Shoals    AL  142 Harrisburg-Carlisle    PA  
93 Detroit-Warren-Livonia    MI  118 Fond du Lac    WI  143 Harrisonburg    VA  
94 Dothan    AL  119 Fort Collins-Loveland    CO  144 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford    CT  
95 Dover    DE  120 Fort Smith    AR-OK  145 Hattiesburg    MS  
96 Dubuque    IA  121 Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin    FL  146 Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton    NC  
97 Duluth    MN-WI  122 Fort Wayne    IN  147 Hinesville-Fort Stewart    GA  
98 Durham    NC  123 Fresno    CA  148 Holland-Grand Haven    MI  
99 Eau Claire    WI  124 Gadsden    AL  149 Honolulu    HI  
100 El Centro    CA  125 Gainesville    FL  150 Hot Springs    AR  
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151 Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux    LA  176 Kingston    NY  201 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana    CA  
152 Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land    TX  177 Knoxville    TN  202 Louisville    KY-IN  
153 Huntington-Ashland    WV-KY-OH  178 Kokomo    IN  203 Lubbock    TX  
154 Huntsville    AL  179 La Crosse    WI-MN  204 Lynchburg    VA  
155 Idaho Falls    ID  180 Lafayette    IN  205 Macon    GA  
156 Indianapolis    IN  181 Lafayette    LA  206 Madera    CA  
157 Iowa City    IA  182 Lake Charles    LA  207 Madison    WI  
158 Ithaca    NY  183 Lakeland    FL  208 Manchester-Nashua    NH  
159 Jackson    MI  184 Lancaster    PA  209 Mansfield    OH  
160 Jackson    MS  185 Lansing-East Lansing    MI  210 Mayagüez    PR  
161 Jackson    TN  186 Laredo    TX  211 McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr    TX  
162 Jacksonville    FL  187 Las Cruces    NM  212 Medford    OR  
163 Jacksonville    NC  188 Las Vegas-Paradise    NV  213 Memphis    TN-MS-AR  
164 Janesville    WI  189 Lawrence    KS  214 Merced    CA  
165 Jefferson City    MO  190 Lawton    OK  215 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach    FL  
166 Johnson City    TN  191 Lebanon    PA  216 Michigan City-La Porte    IN  
167 Johnstown    PA  192 Lewiston    ID-WA  217 Midland    TX  
168 Jonesboro    AR  193 Lewiston-Auburn    ME  218 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis    WI  
169 Joplin    MO  194 Lexington-Fayette    KY  219 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington    MN-WI  
170 Kalamazoo-Portage    MI  195 Lima    OH  220 Missoula    MT  
171 Kankakee-Bradley    IL  196 Lincoln    NE  221 Mobile    AL  
172 Kansas City    MO-KS  197 Little Rock-North Little Rock    AR  222 Modesto    CA  
173 Kennewick-Richland-Pasco    WA  198 Logan    UT-ID  223 Monroe    LA  
174 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood    TX  199 Longview    TX  224 Monroe    MI  
175 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol    TN-VA  200 Longview    WA  225 Montgomery    AL  
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226 Morgantown    WV  251 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville    FL  276 Reading    PA  
227 Morristown    TN  252 Panama City-Lynn Haven    FL  277 Redding    CA  
228 Mount Vernon-Anacortes    WA  253 Parkersburg-Marietta    WV-OH  278 Reno-Sparks    NV  
229 Muncie    IN  254 Pascagoula    MS  279 Richmond    VA  
230 Muskegon-Norton Shores    MI  255 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent    FL  280 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario    CA  
231 Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach    SC  256 Peoria    IL  281 Roanoke    VA  
232 Napa    CA  257 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington    PA-NJ-DE-MD  282 Rochester    MN  
233 Naples-Marco Island    FL  258 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale    AZ  283 Rochester    NY  
234 Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro    TN  259 Pine Bluff    AR  284 Rockford    IL  
235 New Haven-Milford    CT  260 Pittsburgh    PA  285 Rocky Mount    NC  
236 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner    LA  261 Pittsfield    MA  286 Rome    GA  
237 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island   NY-NJ-PA 262 Pocatello    ID  287 Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville    CA  
238 Niles-Benton Harbor    MI  263 Ponce    PR  288 Saginaw-Saginaw Township North    MI  
239 Norwich-New London    CT  264 Portland-South Portland-Biddeford    ME  289 St. Cloud    MN  
240 Ocala    FL  265 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton    OR-WA  290 St. George    UT  
241 Ocean City    NJ  266 Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce    FL  291 St. Joseph    MO-KS  
242 Odessa    TX  267 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown    NY  292 St. Louis    MO-IL  
243 Ogden-Clearfield    UT  268 Prescott    AZ  293 Salem    OR  
244 Oklahoma City    OK  269 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River    RI-MA  294 Salinas    CA  
245 Olympia    WA  270 Provo-Orem    UT  295 Salisbury    MD  
246 Omaha-Council Bluffs    NE-IA  271 Pueblo    CO  296 Salt Lake City    UT  
247 Orlando    FL  272 Punta Gorda    FL  297 San Angelo    TX  
248 Oshkosh-Neenah    WI  273 Racine    WI  298 San Antonio    TX  
249 Owensboro    KY  274 Raleigh-Cary    NC  299 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos    CA  
250 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura    CA  275 Rapid City    SD  300 Sandusky    OH  
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301 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont    CA  326 State College    PA  351 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria    DC-VA-MD-WV  
302 San Germán-Cabo Rojo    PR  327 Stockton    CA  352 Waterloo-Cedar Falls    IA  
303 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara    CA  328 Sumter    SC  353 Wausau    WI  
304 San Juan-Caguas-Guaynabo    PR  329 Syracuse    NY  354 Weirton-Steubenville    WV-OH  
305 San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles    CA  330 Tallahassee    FL  355 Wenatchee    WA  
306 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta    CA  331 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater    FL  356 Wheeling    WV-OH  
307 Santa Cruz-Watsonville    CA  332 Terre Haute    IN  357 Wichita    KS  
308 Santa Fe    NM  333 Texarkana    TX-Texarkana    AR  358 Wichita Falls    TX  
309 Santa Rosa-Petaluma    CA  334 Toledo    OH  359 Williamsport    PA  
310 Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice    FL  335 Topeka    KS  360 Wilmington    NC  
311 Savannah    GA  336 Trenton-Ewing    NJ  361 Winchester    VA-WV  
312 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre    PA  337 Tucson    AZ  362 Winston-Salem    NC  
313 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue    WA  338 Tulsa    OK  363 Worcester    MA  
314 Sheboygan    WI  339 Tuscaloosa    AL  364 Yakima    WA  
315 Sherman-Denison    TX  340 Tyler    TX  365 Yauco    PR  
316 Shreveport-Bossier City    LA  341 Utica-Rome    NY  366 York-Hanover    PA  
317 Sioux City    IA-NE-SD  342 Valdosta    GA  367 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman    OH-PA  
318 Sioux Falls    SD  343 Vallejo-Fairfield    CA  368 Yuba City    CA  
319 South Bend-Mishawaka    IN-MI  344 Vero Beach    FL  369 Yuma    AZ  






321 Spokane    WA  346 Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton    NJ  
322 Springfield    IL  347 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News    VA-NC  
323 Springfield    MA  348 Visalia-Porterville    CA  
324 Springfield    MO  349 Waco    TX  
325 Springfield    OH  350 Warner Robins    GA  
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Table 2   Summary Statistics 
 
Relative Wage 
SIC code N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
01    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  CROPS 852 0.517 0.152 0.097 1.134 
02    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  LIVESTOCK 761 0.606 0.174 0.147 1.897 
08    FORESTRY 599 0.691 0.272 0.295 3.200 
09    FISHING, HUNTING, AND TRAPPING 86 0.979 0.459 0.336 2.517 
10    METAL MINING 14 2.790 1.410 1.382 5.298 
12     COAL MINING 22 1.564 0.241 0.976 1.972 
13    OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 377 1.332 0.434 0.557 3.355 
14    NONMETALLIC MINERALS, EXCEPT FUELS 401 1.100 0.252 0.478 1.827 
20    FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 861 0.821 0.269 0.273 2.843 
22    TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 139 0.857 0.195 0.303 1.370 
23    APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 197 0.692 0.173 0.334 1.106 
24    LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 1142 0.763 0.185 0.363 1.712 
25    FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 276 0.927 0.228 0.411 1.702 
26    PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 467 1.154 0.166 0.679 1.744 
27    PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 1877 0.902 0.224 0.296 2.040 
28    CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 448 1.477 0.559 0.648 8.998 
29    PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 161 1.727 0.372 1.106 2.742 
30    RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 371 0.995 0.262 0.315 2.062 
31    LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 168 0.597 0.137 0.334 1.091 
32    STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 1010 1.007 0.194 0.275 1.679 
33    PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 311 1.146 0.292 0.589 2.263 
34    FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 1035 1.023 0.228 0.217 2.242 
35    INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1543 1.071 0.333 0.208 6.116 
36    ELECTRONIC + OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 542 1.268 0.374 0.542 4.485 
37    TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 627 1.122 0.326 0.460 2.229 
38    INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 538 1.366 0.414 0.497 5.872 
39    MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING 




SIC code N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
01    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  CROPS 852 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.022 
02    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  LIVESTOCK 761 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
08    FORESTRY 599 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
09    FISHING, HUNTING, AND TRAPPING 86 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.011 
10    METAL MINING 14 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.013 
12     COAL MINING 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13    OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14    NONMETALLIC MINERALS, EXCEPT FUELS 401 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20    FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 861 0.015 0.010 0.004 0.030 
22    TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 139 0.109 0.004 0.104 0.114 
23    APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 197 0.126 0.018 0.100 0.150 
24    LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 1142 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25    FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 276 0.020 0.017 0.000 0.040 
26    PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 467 0.015 0.006 0.008 0.022 
27    PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 1877 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
28    CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 448 0.039 0.002 0.037 0.042 
29    PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 161 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.007 
30    RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 371 0.053 0.000 0.053 0.053 
31    LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 168 0.085 0.001 0.083 0.085 
32    STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 1010 0.043 0.005 0.037 0.049 
33    PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 311 0.037 0.010 0.024 0.049 
34    FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 1035 0.037 0.007 0.029 0.046 
35    INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1543 0.019 0.015 0.000 0.037 
36    ELECTRONIC + OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 542 0.030 0.012 0.013 0.042 
37    TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 627 0.028 0.003 0.025 0.031 
38    INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 538 0.031 0.010 0.017 0.040 
39    MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING 




SIC code N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
01    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  CROPS 852 0.431 0.173 0.259 0.642 
02    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  LIVESTOCK 761 0.457 0.472 0.000 0.998 
08    FORESTRY 599 0.053 0.062 0.000 0.134 
09    FISHING, HUNTING, AND TRAPPING 86 0.165 0.178 0.000 0.381 
10    METAL MINING 14 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.014 
12     COAL MINING 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13    OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 377 0.175 0.299 0.000 0.896 
14    NONMETALLIC MINERALS, EXCEPT FUELS 401 0.025 0.031 0.000 0.080 
20    FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 861 0.547 0.269 0.180 0.855 
22    TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 139 0.329 0.215 0.001 0.571 
23    APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 197 0.623 0.335 0.000 0.950 
24    LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 1142 0.348 0.401 0.000 0.815 
25    FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 276 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.004 
26    PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 467 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
27    PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 1877 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
28    CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 448 0.230 0.229 0.000 0.505 
29    PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 161 0.417 0.483 0.000 0.983 
30    RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 371 0.085 0.048 0.000 0.160 
31    LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 168 0.121 0.072 0.000 0.231 
32    STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 1010 0.028 0.013 0.000 0.046 
33    PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 311 0.128 0.146 0.000 0.375 
34    FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 1035 0.148 0.126 0.000 0.348 
35    INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1543 0.101 0.044 0.003 0.149 
36    ELECTRONIC + OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 542 0.284 0.167 0.000 0.498 
37    TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 627 0.457 0.322 0.000 0.803 
38    INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 538 0.103 0.054 0.000 0.153 
39    MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES 1468 0.118 0.097 0.000 0.233 
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Table 3   Industry specific effects of Tariff and NTB 
 
Tariff 
SIC code Coefficient Std. error  
01    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  CROPS -1.499 2.78  
09    FISHING, HUNTING, AND TRAPPING -10.975 15.87  
10    METAL MINING 35.522 13.13 *** 
20    FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS -0.668 1.53  
22    TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 9.348 7.83  
23    APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS -1.068 1.54  
25    FURNITURE AND FIXTURES -0.698 2.53  
26    PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 5.394 2.27 *** 
28    CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS -2.711 5.63  
29    PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 23.21 16.72  
31    LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 12.568 20.19  
32    STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 1.754 1.76  
33    PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 1.231 1.91  
34    FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 1.265 1.6  
35    INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 0.015 1.17  
36    ELECTRONIC + OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT -5.339 1.37 *** 
37    TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 5.148 5.69  




SIC code Coefficient Std. Error  
01    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  CROPS 0.006 0.13  
02    AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  LIVESTOCK -0.006 0.1  
08    FORESTRY -0.063 0.18  
09    FISHING, HUNTING, AND TRAPPING -0.57 0.4  
10    METAL MINING -34.772 12.31 *** 
13    OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION -0.008 0.11  
14    NONMETALLIC MINERALS, EXCEPT FUELS 0.475 0.37  
20    FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 0.023 0.11  
22    TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 0.104 0.18  
23    APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 0.102 0.11  
24    LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 0.016 0.1  
25    FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 1.433 21.49  
26    PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS -69.456 47.63  
27    PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 8.851 9.05  
28    CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 0.177 0.11  
29    PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 0.057 0.11  
30    RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 0.109 0.26  
31    LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 0.211 0.27  
32    STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS -0.041 0.56  
33    PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 0.196 0.15  
34    FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 0.117 0.12  
35    INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT -0.109 0.16  
36    ELECTRONIC + OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 0.096 0.11  
37    TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 0.05 0.11  






Conclusion and the Direction of Future Research 
 
 This dissertation tackles three selected issues pertaining to economic integration. 
It first focuses on the intro-bloc trade negotiation process in the presence of illegal 
immigration. Trade policy and immigration policy tend to be dealt separately and its 
mutual relation is often overlooked by both academics and policy makers. It illuminates 
this interrelation hoping that policy makers take two issues together in building the 
appropriate trade and immigration policies. We find that trade liberalization increases the 
amount of illegal immigration. Further, the condition under which a complete free trade 
still improves welfare of an economy even in the presence of illegal immigration is 
identified. It also extends the analysis by adding endogenous terms of trade. The optimal 
trade policy becomes complex as it depends on how tariffs affect the wage rate of own 
and the partner country, how tariffs affect terms of trade, and how tariffs and terms of 
trade influence illegal immigration. Understanding these relations is a key for a 
successful trade negotiation.  
 The second issue tackled in the dissertation is how international trade and factor 
flows impact domestic taxation. We looked the effective tax rates on earnings from the 
capital and labor incomes and from the consumption expenditure to answer the question. 
There has been a strong concern particularly in Europe that the wave of economic 
integration has forced the countries to shift the tax burden from capital to labor. As 
European countries have had higher unemployment rates and some argue that it is due to 
a high labor tax rate, whether economic integration has some impacts on domestic 
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taxation is a critical question that should be answered. The question is also relevant to 
many developing countries where the capital market is still premature stage of 
development while earnings from the labor market remain low. Meanwhile, they receive 
more and more pressure to open their economy through bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations. Our empirical study shows that trade and capital flow have not affected the 
average effective tax rates on capital or labor. However, increase in trade and factor flows 
are associated with lower consumption tax rate. Labor inflow is associated with a lower 
capital tax rate. We could not confirm the claim that the tax burden has been shifted from 
capital to labor due to economic integration. 
 Finally, the dissertation raised the question whether domestic labor is mobile 
enough that trade policy has an identical impact on the wage rate throughout regions in a 
country. We chose the United States as a case study as we take advantage of a large 
number of regional wage data and the extensively available tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
data. We find some evidence that changes in tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers have had 
regional impacts in the United States. Skill premium changed in opposite directions 
among different regions. The change in trade policy raised the wage rate in one region 
but lowered in another region even if two are the same skill workers. The study reveals 
that the assessment of the trade policy requires both its impact on a national welfare and 
redistribution of regional welfare. 
 Future research will focus on four issues that are not answered in the dissertation. 
First, how much a tariff reduction actually increases immigration is an empirical question 
that has to be examined. The actual figure of illegal immigration is almost impossible to 
comprehend, but the number of undocumented aliens apprehended can suggest the 
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qualitative implication. Furthermore, the data on legal immigration has been improved 
and obtainable even at different skill levels. These may help us understand better how the 
overall trend toward free trade has influenced labor flows around the world. Second, no 
country has taken a drastic path of trade liberalization from a closed economy to a 
complete open economy. The path of trade liberalization has been gradual for all 
countries. When considering the effect on factor flows, then, what would be the optimal 
dynamic speed of trade liberalization? This is the second agenda for future research. 
Third, does economic integration lead to change in tax incident among different income 
group? Our study finds that it leads to lower consumption tax which is the most 
repressive taxation. Do low income groups benefit from economic integration because of 
this change? Finally, did the abundant factor in each region lose from changes in tariff 
and NTB? Previous literature confirms that different regions in the United States have 
different factor abundance and our study finds that there are winners and losers among 
the regions for each skill category of workers. Whether those who lose from change in 
trade policy are the owners of abundant factor in each region is the empirical question 
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